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Forensic Science:
Daubert’s Failure
Paul C. Giannelli†
“The man who discovers a new scientific truth has previously
had to smash to atoms almost everything he had learnt, and
arrives at the new truth with hands bloodstained from the
slaughter of a thousand platitudes.”1
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Introduction
In 2015, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted that “[m]any defendants have been convicted and spent countless
years in prison based on evidence by arson experts who were later
shown to be little better than witch doctors.”2 In the same year, Dr. Jo
Handelsman, a White House science advisor, observed: “Suggesting that
bite marks [should] still be a seriously used technology is not based on
science, on measurement, on something that has standards, but more
of a gut-level reaction.”3 According to Judge Catharine Easterly of the
D.C. Court of Appeals, “[a]s matters currently stand, a certainty
statement regarding toolmark pattern matching has the same probative
value as the vision of a psychic.”4 A New York Times editorial echoed
these sentiments:
[C]ourts have only made the problem worse by purporting to be
scientifically literate, and allowing in all kinds of evidence that
2.

Alex Kozinski, Preface: Criminal Law 2.0, 44 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim.
Proc. iii, v (2015); see also Almeciga v. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting,
Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 401, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Rakoff, J.) (“There have
been too many pseudo-scientific disciplines that have since been exposed as
profoundly flawed, unreliable, or baseless for any Court to take this
[gatekeeping] role lightly.”).

3.

See Radley Balko, A High-Ranking Obama Official Just Called for the
“Eradication” of Bite Mark Evidence, Wash. Post (July 22, 2015), https:
//www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/07/22/a-high-ranking
-obama-official-just-called-for-the-eradication-of-bite-mark-evidence/?utm_
term=.449f38b65769 [https://perma.cc/F9ES-B79J] (quoting Handelsman’s
remarks presented at the International Symposium on Forensic Science Error
Management: Detection, Measurement and Mitigation, Arlington, Virginia
(July 20–24, 2015), organized by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST)).

4.

Williams v. United States, 130 A.3d 343, 355 (D.C. 2016) (Easterly, J.,
concurring).
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would not make it within shouting distance of a peer-reviewed
journal. Of the 329 exonerations based on DNA testing since 1989,
more than one-quarter involved convictions based on “pattern”
evidence—like hair samples, ballistics, tire tracks, and bite
marks—testified to by so-called experts.5

These criticisms are valid—which raises a puzzling and
consequential question: Why didn’t the Supreme Court’s “junk science”
decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,6 prevent or
restrict the admissibility of testimony based on flawed forensic
techniques? After all, Daubert was decided in 1993, twenty-five years
ago.
A.

Daubert and Rule 702

Daubert was considered a revolutionary decision.7 It “radically
changed the standard for admissibility of scientific testimony”8 by
sweeping away the Frye v. United States9 “general acceptance” test,10
which had been the majority rule in both federal and state cases.11 The
Frye standard gave great deference to the views of forensic practitioners
and not to empirical testing.12 Daubert promised to be different. The
Supreme Court held that “[p]roposed testimony must be supported by
5.

Editorial, Junk Science at the F.B.I., N.Y. Times (Apr. 27, 2015), https:
//www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/opinion/junk-science-at-the-fbi.html [https:
//perma.cc/6PH3-8SPL]; see also Eric S. Lander, Fix the Flaws in Forensic
Science, N.Y. Times (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/04/21/opinion/fix-the-flaws-in-forensic-science.html [https://perma.cc/
8LPZ-BWHX] (“No expert should be permitted to testify without showing
three things: a public database of patterns from many representative
samples; precise and objective criteria for declaring matches; and peerreviewed published studies that validate the methods.”).

6.

509 U.S. 579 (1993).

7.

See David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 Sci. 339, 340
(2002) (“Daubert initiated a scientific revolution in the law.”).

8.

United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000); see also United
States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Daubert has become
ubiquitous in federal trial courts.”).

9.

293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

10.

Id. at 1014 (stating that a technique “must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”).

11.

See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye
v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1228
(1980).

12.

See Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 Hastings L.J. 1069,
1138 (1998) (“Frye does not work because its measure of validity is the
judgment of ‘the field,’ and the field may consist of nonsense. For example,
the Frye doctrine cannot exclude astrology.”).
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appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’based on what is known. In
short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific
knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.”13 In making this reliability determination, the Daubert Court highlighted five
factors: (1) empirical testing, (2) peer review and publication, (3) error
rate, (4) maintenance of standards, and (5) general acceptance.14 The
first and most important factor is empirical testing. The other factors
are supplementary.15 Peer review and publication are designed to expose
defects in testing. Acceptance of a technique within the scientific
community is achieved through the publication of valid test results.
Similarly, both error rates and standards are derived from testing.
Daubert was followed in 1999 by Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,16
which held that Daubert’s reliability standard applied to all expert testimony, not only scientific evidence.17 By 2000, the Supreme Court was
describing Daubert as establishing an “exacting” standard.18 In the same
year, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to incorporate the
Daubert-Kumho standard.19 Although a handful of jurisdictions
continue to apply the Frye test, about forty jurisdictions have adopted
the Daubert standard in one form or another.20
During this time, there was no shortage of commentary on the lack
of empirical research in forensic science.21 For example, shortly after
13.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (emphasis
added).

14.

Id. at 593–94.

15.

Id.

16.

526 U.S. 137 (1999).

17.

Id. at 141.

18.

Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).

19.

After Daubert, the Court decided General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997). Joiner established the standard for appellate review—abuse of
discretion—for applying the Daubert factors. Id. at 139. Daubert, Joiner, and
Kumho make up what is known as the Daubert Trilogy.

20.

See 1 Paul C. Giannelli et al., Scientific Evidence § 1.11 (5th ed.
2012).

21.

A few perceptive scholars had noted the lack of empirical testing prior to
Daubert. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for
Regulation, 4 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 109, 137 (1991) (“Forensic science is
supported by almost no research. The laboratory practices are based on
intuitions and deductions, not on empirical proof.”); D. Michael Risinger et
al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons
of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731, 738
(1989) (“Our literature search for empirical evaluation of handwriting
identification turned up one primitive and flawed validity study from nearly
50 years ago, one 1973 paper that raises the issue of consistency among
examiners but that presents only uncontrolled impressionistic and anecdotal
information not qualifying as data in any rigorous sense, and a summary of
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Daubert was decided, Professor Margaret Berger wrote: “Considerable
forensic evidence made its way into the courtroom without empirical
validation of the underlying theory and/or its particular application.”22
After Kumho, two commentators—citing bite mark, hair, and firearm
analysis—observed that “little rigorous, systematic research has been
done to validate the discipline’s basic premises and techniques, and in
each area there was no evident reason why such research would be infeasible.”23
Notwithstanding Daubert’s promise, scholars soon discerned its
uneven application in civil and criminal cases: “[T]he heightened standards of dependability imposed on expertise proffered in civil cases has
continued to expand, but . . . expertise proffered by the prosecution in
criminal cases has been largely insulated from any change in preDaubert standards or approach.”24 The title of a 2005 article summed
up the state of the law—“The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to
Criminal Justice.”25 In short, in the criminal context, courts applied
Daubert-lite.
B.

National Academy of Sciences Forensic Report (2009)

In 2006 Congress entered the picture by authorizing the National
Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) to conduct a study of forensic science.
After a three-year investigation, NAS issued a landmark report. One of
one study in a 1978 government report. Beyond this, nothing.”); Michael J.
Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA “Fingerprinting” Can Teach the
Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 361, 372
(1991) (“[F]orensic scientists, like scientists in all other fields, should subject
their claims to methodologically rigorous empirical tests. The results of these
tests should be published and debated. Until such steps are taken, the strong
claims of forensic scientists must be regarded with far more caution than
they traditionally have been.”).
22.

Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test,
78 Minn. L. Rev. 1345, 1354 (1994) (“Courts never required some of the
most venerable branches of forensic science—such as fingerprinting,
ballistics, and handwriting—to demonstrate their ability to make unique
identifications.”).

23.

Paul Giannelli & Edward Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence: The Fallout
from Supreme Court’s Decision in Kumho Tires, Crim. Just., Winter 2000,
at 12, 40. For an insightful analysis of how identification science was accepted
by the courts, see Saks, supra note 12.

24.

D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards
of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 99, 149 (2000). In
addition, an extensive study of reported criminal cases found that “the
Daubert decision did not impact on the admission rates of expert testimony
at either the trial or the appellate court levels.” Jennifer L. Groscup et al.,
The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State
and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 339, 364 (2002).

25.

Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and
Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health S107, S107 (2005).
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its most riveting passages concluded: “Among existing forensic methods, only nuclear DNA analysis has been rigorously shown to have the
capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between an evidentiary sample and a specific individual or source.”26 The report went on to state that “some forensic
science disciplines are supported by little rigorous systematic research
to validate the discipline’s basic premises and techniques.”27 Such common forensic techniques as fingerprint examinations,28 firearm
(“ballistics”) and toolmark identifications,29 handwriting examinations,30 microscopic hair analysis,31 and bite mark comparisons32 fell into
this category.
Not only did the NAS report highlight flaws in forensic science, it
sharply criticized the judiciary for failing to demand the validation that
Daubert required: “The bottom line is simple: In a number of forensic
science disciplines, forensic science professionals have yet to establish
either the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions,
and the courts have been utterly ineffective in addressing this problem.”33 In a later passage, the report declared that “Daubert has done
little to improve the use of forensic science evidence in criminal cases.”34
The disparate treatment of civil actions and criminal prosecutions was
also noted. After finding that “trial judges rarely exclude or restrict expert testimony offered by prosecutors,” the report commented: “ironically, the appellate courts appear to be more willing to second-guess
26.

Comm. on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sci. Cmty., Nat’l
Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward 100 (2009) [hereinafter NAS Forensic
Report].

27.

Id. at 22. At another point, the Report stated: “The simple reality is that
the interpretation of forensic evidence is not always based on scientific
studies to determine its validity. This is a serious problem.” Id. at 8; see also
id. at 6 (“Often there are no standard protocols governing forensic practice
in a given discipline. And, even when protocols are in place . . . , they often
are vague and not enforced in any meaningful way.”).

28.

Id. at 144 (noting that research is needed “[t]o properly underpin the process
of friction ridge [fingerprint] identification”).

29.

Id. at 154 (“Sufficient studies [on firearms identification] have not been done
to understand the reliability and repeatability of the methods.”).

30.

Id. at 166 (“The scientific basis for handwriting comparisons needs to be
strengthened.”).

31.

Id. at 161 (“[T]estimony linking microscopic hair analysis with particular
defendants is highly unreliable.”).

32.

Id. at 174 (“No thorough study has been conducted of large populations to
establish the uniqueness of bite marks . . . .”).

33.

Id. at 53 (emphasis added).

34.

Id. at 106.
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trial court judgments on the admissibility of purported scientific evidence in civil cases than in criminal cases.”35 Despite the NAS report,
courts continued to admit the same evidence. Only a handful of courts
applied the “exacting” standard that the Supreme Court said Daubert
demanded.36
This Article examines the justice system’s failure by reviewing the
status of two categories of forensic techniques. The first category involves discredited techniques: (1) bite mark analysis, (2) microscopic
hair comparisons, (3) arson evidence, and (4) comparative bullet lead
analysis. The second category involves techniques that have been misleadingly presented, including firearm and toolmark identifications and
fingerprint examinations. Both categories present Daubert issues. The
Article argues that the system’s failure can be traced back to its inability to demand and properly evaluate foundational research—i.e.,
Daubert’s first factor, empirical testing. Indeed, the justice system may
be institutionally incapable of applying Daubert in criminal cases.
A different paradigm is needed, one that assigns an independent
agency the responsibility of evaluating foundational research. As discussed in Part IV, this approach was recently recommended by the
National Commission on Forensic Science37 and the President’s Council
of Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”).38 Both recommended that the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(“NIST”) evaluate all forensic disciplines on a continuing basis, thereby
injecting much needed scientific expertise into the criminal justice
system. The recent reports on latent fingerprints39 and arson

35.

Id. at 11.

36.

See, e.g., Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). A former federal
district judge, Nancy Gertner, noted, “a busy trial judge can rely on the
decades of case law to legitimize decisions rejecting a hearing or motions in
limine. And the trial judge can count on the Court of Appeals likely
concluding that rejecting the challenge was not an abuse of the judge’s
discretion.” Nancy Gertner, Commentary on The Need for a Research
Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 789, 790 (2011).

37.

In 2013, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), in partnership with the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”), established the
National Commission on Forensic Science to enhance the practice and
improve the reliability of forensic science. The author served on the
Commission. Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., U.S. DOJ, Reflecting
Back—Looking Toward the Future 1, app. A at 1 (2017).

38.

President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., Report to the
President: Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring
Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods (2016)
[hereinafter White House PCAST Report].

39.

See William Thompson et al., Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of
Sci., Forensic Science Assessments: A Quality and Gap Analysis:
Latent Fingerprint Analysis 7–8, 43–44 (2017) [hereinafter AAAS
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investigations,40 which were published by the American Association for
the Advancement of Science (“AAAS”), buttress the need for independent scientific evaluations.

I. Discredited Techniques
A.

Bite Mark Comparisons

For decades, bite-mark evidence has been admitted in hundreds of
trials,41 many of which were capital prosecutions.42 No reported American case has rejected bite mark testimony. Moreover, it is not uncommon for courts to speak of bite mark comparisons as a “science”43
—even an “exact science.”44 Acceptance of the technique is so deeply
entrenched that some courts have taken judicial notice of its validity,45
which means its reliability is indisputable.46
Distinctive characteristics of a person’s dentition were first used to
identify skeletonized remains and individuals in mass disasters such a
Fingerprint Report] (discussing cognitive bias, recommending remedies,
and arguing for the need of scientific validation studies).
40.

See José Almirall et al., Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci.,
Forensic Science Assessments: A Quality and Gap Analysis: Fire
Investigation 8–9 (2017) [hereinafter AAAS Fire Report] (discussing
cognitive bias and recommending remedies).

41.

See 1 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, § 13.05 (discussing the admissibility
of bite mark evidence). In Doyle v. State, 263 S.W.2d 779, 779 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1954), a bite mark was left in a piece of cheese in a burglary case. Two
decades later, in Patterson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974), a prosecution expert matched the defendant’s teeth to a mark found
on a murder victim.

42.

See, e.g., Tucker Carrington, Mississippi Innocence: The Convictions and
Exonerations of Levon Brooks and Kennedy Brewer and the Failure of the
American Promise, 28 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 123, 134–35, 142–45, 149–50
(2015).

43.

See, e.g., People v. Marsh, 441 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he
science of bite-mark analysis has been extensively reviewed in other
jurisdictions.”).

44.

See, e.g., State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 569 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).

45.

See State v. Richards, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (Ariz. 1990) (“[B]ite mark evidence
is admissible without a preliminary determination of reliability . . . .”);
People v. Middleton, 429 N.E.2d 100, 101 (N.Y. 1981) (“The reliability of
bite mark evidence as a means of identification is sufficiently established in
the scientific community to make such evidence admissible in a criminal case,
without separately establishing scientific reliability in each case . . . .”); State
v. Armstrong, 369 S.E.2d 870, 877 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that trial court
may take judicial notice of general reliability of bite mark evidence).

46.

See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (limiting judicial notice to a “fact that is not
subject to reasonable dispute”).
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plane crashes.47 Courts assumed that these distinctive characteristics
can be transferred to another person’s skin during a violent crime—e.g.,
homicides, rapes, and child abuse48—an assumption that overlooked
some obvious problems. First, bite marks typically involve no more than
the edges of six to eight front teeth, not thirty-two teeth with five
anatomical surfaces that can be used when comparing a deceased person’s dentition with X-rays. Second, bite marks do not reveal artifacts
such as fillings, crowns, etc., all of which assist in associating human
remains with a person’s dental records.49 Moreover, human skin is extremely malleable and thus subject to various types of distortion.50 In
addition, bite mark analysis is a subjective technique with no agreedupon methodology.

47.

1 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, § 13.02 (discussing the admissibility of
dental identifications).

48.

See People v. Milone, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (“The
concept of identifying a suspect by matching his dentition to a bite mark
found at the scene of a crime is a logical extension of the accepted principle
that each person’s dentition is unique.”); People v. Smith, 443 N.Y.S.2d 551,
556–57 (Cty. Ct. 1981) (“The basic premise is the unique nature of individual
dentition and the virtually infinite number of individual bite
configurations.”) (citations omitted).

49.

“Restorations alone, with varying shapes, sizes, and restorative materials,
may offer numerous points for comparison. In addition to restorations, the
number of teeth, prostheses, decay, malposition, malrotation, peculiar
shapes, root canal therapy, bone patterns, bite relationship, and oral
pathology may all provide identifying characteristics.” 1 Giannelli et al.,
supra note 20, § 13.02.

50.

See I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark
Analyses—A Critical Review, 41 Sci. & Just. 85, 87 (2001) (“Skin is a poor
registration material since it is highly variable in terms of anatomical
location, underlying musculature or fat, curvature, and looseness or
adherence to underlying tissues. Skin is highly visco-elastic, which allows
stretching to occur during either the biting process or when evidence is
collected.”).
One study classified different types of distortion: Primary distortion
occurs at the time of biting and results (1) from the dynamics of the biting
process (dynamic distortion) and (2) from the features of the tissue bitten
(tissue distortion). Secondary distortion occurs at a subsequent time. It can
be subdivided into three categories. The first is time-related distortion, e.g.,
caused by subsequent healing or decomposition. “Posture distortion results
when the bite mark is viewed or recorded in a position that differs from the
position at the time of biting.” Photographic distortion results from the angle
of the camera and the curvature of the body. D.R. Sheasby & D.G.
MacDonald, A Forensic Classification of Distortion in Human Bite Marks,
122 Forensic Sci. Int’l 75, 75–77 (2001).
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1. Foundational Research

Despite overwhelming judicial approval, bite mark evidence is not
supported by foundational research.51 Indeed, the only rigorous studies
are recent—and undercut the technique’s validity.52 The 2009 NAS
forensic report concluded that “the scientific basis is insufficient to
conclude that bite mark comparisons can result in a conclusive
match.”53 Despite the NAS Report, courts continued to permit expert
testimony on the subject. For example, in State v. Prade,54 decided in
2014, the expert testified that “bite mark evidence is generally accepted
within the scientific community . . . .”55 Similarly, in Coronado v.
State,56 a different expert stated that he did not “agree with the NAS
Report’s conclusion that bite mark analysis cannot result in a conclusive
match,” adding, “you do not have to be a ‘rocket scientist’ to see that,
in some cases, there is a unique and distinct pattern of teeth that can
be identified.”57 In addition, these experts rejected the valid research
51.

See Saks, supra note 12, at 1120 (“[R]ather than the field convincing the
courts of the sufficiency of its knowledge and skills, admission by the courts
apparently convinced the forensic odontology community that, despite their
doubts, they really were able to perform bite mark identifications.”).

52.

Dr. Mary Bush and her colleagues at the Laboratory for Forensic
Odontology, State University of New York at Buffalo, have published over
a dozen studies that have undermined the assumptions underpinning bite
mark evidence. E.g., Mary A. Bush et al., Statistical Evidence for the
Similarity of the Human Dentition, 56 J. Forensic Scis. 118, 122 (2011)
(“Our results show that given our measurement parameters, statements
concerning dental uniqueness with respect to bitemark analysis in an open
population are unsupportable. . . . Confidence in the notion of dental
uniqueness in bitemark analysis has been based on anecdotal knowledge, the
use of inappropriate statistics, and precedence of admission in the
courtroom.”). Bush and her team also reported the results of a study where
twenty-three bites were made in cadaver skin with the same dentition using
an instrumented-biting machine. The cadavers were moved and rephotographed in different positions. Subsequent measurements showed
differences between all bite marks. In addition, postural distortion was
significant. See Mary A. Bush et al., Biomechanical Factors in Human
Dermal Bitemarks in a Cadaver Model, 54 J. Forensic Scis. 167, 169–170,
174 (2009). One survey of fifteen odontologists involved their opinions of six
images of supposed bite marks. The “practitioner agreement was at best fair,
with wide-ranging opinions on the origin, circumstance, and characteristics
of the wound given for all six images.” Mark Page et al., Expert
Interpretation of Bitemark Injuries—A Contemporary Qualitative Study, 58
J. Forensic Scis. 664, 664 (2013).

53.

NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 175.

54.

9 N.E.3d 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).

55.

Id. at 1097.

56.

384 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

57.

Id. at 926.
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mentioned above,58 and both prosecutors and their experts attacked researchers without offering any foundational research.59
Unfortunately, the American Board of Forensic Odontology
(“ABFO”) has fiercely defended bite mark analysis. To bolster its
position, the ABFO conducted a study that was presented at a forensic
conference in 2015.60 As it turned out, the study undercut the ABFO’s
own position. Thirty-nine ABFO-certified bite mark experts—with an
average of twenty years’ experience—examined one hundred bite mark
photographs.61 Each was asked three questions:
1. Is there sufficient evidence in the presented materials to render
an opinion on whether the patterned injury is a human bite
mark?

58.

See, e.g., Prade, 9 N.E.3d at 1098 (“As to Dr. Bush’s cadaver studies, Dr.
Wright testified that cadaver skin simply cannot compare with living skin.
Dr. Wright explained that cadaver skin only distorts after a bite for two to
three minutes at most because, unlike live skin, no bruising, contusions, or
lacerations occur. Dr. Wright also testified that using a mechanical jaw to
bite is problematic because the jaw operates on a fixed hinge that cannot
mimic the wider range of movement that an actual jaw is capable of.”). But
see Iain A. Pretty & David Sweet, A Paradigm Shift in the Analysis of
Bitemarks, 201 Forensic Sci. Int’l 38, 40 (2010) (noting that, while
cadaver models have limitations, “there is little alternative for researchers to
produce bitemarks of known origin” and the use of anesthetized pigs to create
peri-mortem injuries raises a different issue—i.e., differences between pigskin
and human skin).

59.

See Radley Balko, In Angry, Defensive Memo, Manhattan DA’s Office
Withdraws Bite Mark Evidence, Wash. Post (Jan. 13, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2016/01/13/in-angry-defens
ive-memo-manhattan-das-office-withdraws-bite-mark-evidence/?utm_term=
.48e8ac4cc71e [https://perma.cc/CMD7-6GM4]; Radley Balko, Attack of the
Bite Mark Matchers, Wash. Post (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/02/18/attack-of-the-bitemark-matchers-2/?utm_term=.3455206afa8d [https://perma.cc/T3R3T7ZH]; Radley Balko, The Path Forward on Bite Mark Matching—and the
Rearview Mirror, Wash. Post (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/02/20/the-path-forwardon-bite-mark-matching-and-the-rearview-mirror/?utm_term=.41c6a22faa7d
[https://perma.cc/9GFW-NABV].

60.

The study is known as Construct Validity Bitemark Assessments Using the
ABFO Bitemark Decision Tree (“Freeman/Pretty Study”). See Am. Acad.
of Forensic Scis., Advance Program 67th Annual Scientific
Meeting: Celebrating the Forensic Science Family 175 (2015).

61.

Radley Balko, A Bite Mark Matching Advocacy Group Just Conducted a
Study that Discredits Bite Mark Evidence, Wash. Post (Apr. 8, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/04/08/a-bitemark-matching-advocacy-group-just-conducted-a-study-that-discredits-bitemark-evidence/?utm_term=.b752ad99e635 [https://perma.cc/EB2B-C
DYD].
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2. Is it a human bite mark, not a human bite mark, or suggestive
of a human bite mark?
3. Does the bite mark have distinct, identifiable arches and
individual tooth marks?62

The results to the first question were not reassuring. The thirtynine experts agreed unanimously in only four out of the one hundred
cases.63 In only twenty cases was there 90 percent or more agreement.64
At the end of question two—whether the mark is a human bite mark—
there were only sixteen cases with 90 percent or more agreement.65 At
the end of the third question, there were only eight cases in which at
least 90 percent of the analysts agreed.66 Equally disturbing was the
ABFO’s decision to postpone publishing the results “until the
organization can tweak the design of the study and conduct it again, a
process that’s expected to take at least a year.”67 In effect, ABFO
wanted a do-over. Meanwhile, an Associated Press analysis reported
that at least twenty-four men convicted or charged with murder or rape
based on bite marks have been exonerated since 2000.68
2. Texas Forensic Science Commission (2016)

Steven Chaney spent twenty-eight years in prison for murder based
largely on bite mark evidence. When his conviction was overturned,69
the Innocence Project filed a complaint on his behalf with the Texas
Forensic Science Commission (“TFSC”).70 In 2016, after a six-month
62.

Id.

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Id.

68.

Amanda Lee Myers, Once Key in Some Cases, Bite-Mark Evidence Now
Derided as Unreliable, Yahoo (June 16, 2013), https://www.yahoo.com/
news/ap-impact-bites-derided-unreliable-court-150004412.html [https://
perma.cc/875Q-9RB6].

69.

Sarah Kaplan, Texas Inmate’s 1989 Conviction Overturned After Bite Mark
Evidence Discredited, Wash. Post (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/10/13/texas-mans-convict
ion-overturned-after-bite-mark-evidence-discredited/?utm_term=.d3513f42c6
99 [https://perma.cc/T6UX-XETE].

70.

Texas Forensic Science Commission Steps Up to Investigate Bite Mark
Analysis, Innocence Project (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.innocence
project.org/texas-forensic-science-commission-steps-up-to-investigate-bitemark-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/BC95-HGB8]. Texas created the Texas
Forensic Science Commission (TFSC) in 2005 after a scandal required
Houston to close its crime lab. Michael Hall, False Impressions, Tex.
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investigation, the TFSC recommended a moratorium on the admission
of bite mark testimony. It found that there is no scientific basis for
claiming that a particular mark can be associated to a person’s dentition: “Any testimony describing human dentition as ‘like a fingerprint’
or incorporating similar analogies lacks scientific support.”71 Similarly,
“there is no scientific basis for assigning probability or statistical weight
to an association, regardless of whether such probability or weight is
expressed numerically (e.g., 1 in a million) or using some form of verbal
scale (e.g., highly likely/unlikely).”72
TFSC was also alarmed that the ABFO study was not published
due to “political and organizational pressures.”73 In the Commission’s
view, “such a resistance to publish scientific data contradicts the ethical
and professional obligations of the profession as a whole, and is especially disconcerting when one considers the life and liberty interests
at stake in criminal cases.”74
3. White House PCAST Report (2016)

In September 2016, the White House released its report on forensic
science.75 Regarding bite mark analysis, it concluded that (1) appropriately designed validation studies are lacking, (2) the few available
studies had “very high” false-positive rates, (3) “inappropriate closedset designs . . . are likely to underestimate the true false positive rate,”
and (4) the studies show that experts “cannot even consistently agree

Monthly (Jan. 2016), https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/falseimpressions/ [https://perma.cc/6JJR-GA9Y]. Accordingly, Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.01, § 4(a)(3) (Supp. 2015), provides that the
Commission should “investigate, in a timely manner, any allegation of
professional negligence or misconduct that would substantially affect the
integrity of the results of a forensic analysis conducted by a crime
laboratory.”
71.

Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n, Forensic Bitemark Comparison
Complaint Filed by National Innocence Project on Behalf of
Steven Mark Chaney—Final Report 11-12 (2016).

72.

Id. at 12.

73.

Id. at 13

74.

Id.; see also Brandi Grissom, Arguments Over Bite Marks Get Testy at Texas
Forensic Science Commission Meeting, Dallas Morning News (Nov. 17,
2015), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2015/11/17/argumentsover-bite-marks-get-testy-at-forensic-science-commission-meeting [https://
perma.cc/V536-3RB8] (reporting on a 2015 TFSC meeting discussing
bitemark evidence).

75.

See generally White House PCAST Report, supra note 38.
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on whether an injury is a human bitemark.”76 Numerous cases support
the last observation.77
In sum, the courts have yet to reject bite mark evidence—a subjective method that is not supported by foundational research and lacks
agreed-upon standards.78 “Perhaps no discredited forensic assay has
benefitted more from criminal courts’ abdication of gatekeeper responsibilities than bite mark analysis.”79 Instead, it was the Innocence Project
that spearheaded the challenges in this area, and in 2016 the Texas
Forensic Science Commission became the first governmental body to
seriously scrutinize the technique. Notwithstanding the NAS, PCAST,
and TFSC reports, courts continue to admit bite mark evidence.80
76.

Id. at 9. “PCAST finds that bitemark analysis is far from meeting the
scientific standards for foundational validity.” Id.

77.

See, e.g., Ege v. Yukins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 852, 878 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (“[T]he
defense attempted to rebut Dr. Warnick’s testimony with the testimony of
other experts who opined that the mark on the victim’s cheek was the result
of livor mortis and was not a bite mark at all.”); Czapleski v. Woodward,
No. C-90-0847 MHP, 1991 WL 639360, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1991)
(noting that, while a dentist’s initial report concluded that “bite” marks
found on child were consistent with dental impressions of mother, several
experts later established that the marks on child’s body were postmortem
abrasion marks and not bite marks); Kinney v. State, 868 S.W.2d 463, 464–
65 (Ark. 1994) (noting disagreement between expert witnesses about whether
injuries were from human bite marks); People v. Noguera, 842 P.2d 1160,
1165 n.1 (Cal. 1992) (“At trial, extensive testimony by forensic
ondontologists [sic] was presented by both sides, pro and con, as to whether
the wounds were human bite marks and, if so, when they were inflicted.”);
State v. Duncan, 802 So. 2d 533, 553 (La. 2001) (“Both defense experts
testified that these marks on the victim’s body were not bite marks.”);
Stubbs v. State, 845 So. 2d 656, 668 (Miss. 2003) (“Dr. Galvez denied the
impressions found on Williams were the results of bite marks.”).

78.

See Michael J. Saks et al., Forensic Bitemark Identification: Weak
Foundations, Exaggerated Claims, 3 J.L. & Biosciences 1, 29 (2016)
(“[R]ecent reviews of the field’s claims, as well as recent empirical findings,
have underscored the lack of reliability and validity of the most fundamental
claims about the ability of forensic dentists to identify the source of bite
marks on human skin.”).

79.

M. Chris Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: Forensic
Science’s Overdue Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 Va. J. Crim. L. 1, 38
(2016).

80.

In Commonwealth v. Ross, No. CP-07-CR 2038-2004, slip op. at 5 (Ct. Com.
Pl. Blair Cty., Pa., filed Mar. 8, 2017), the court admitted bite mark
evidence, albeit limited, noting that “[t]he Commonwealth notes that no
state or federal court has suppressed expert testimony in a criminal case
based upon the NAS Report, and that no courts have prohibited bite mark
evidence based upon the PCAST and TFSC reports.” See also Radley Balko,
Incredibly, Prosecutors Are Still Defending Bite Mark Evidence, Wash.
Post (Jan 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thewatch/wp/2017/01/30/incredibly-prosecutors-are-still-defending-bite-markevidence/ [https://perma.cc/V6TF-HTU9].
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At the April 10, 2017 meeting of the National Commission on
Forensic Science, Keith Harward described how bite mark evidence resulted in his thirty-three years of imprisonment before he was exonerated by DNA evidence.81 Incredibly, the next day the chairman of the
National District Attorneys Association stated that his organization
believes that bite mark evidence is a “reliable science.”82
B.

Microscopic Hair Analysis

In this examination, samples are first analyzed to identify features
visible to the naked eye such as color and form, i.e., whether it is
straight, wavy, or curved. Next, the sample is viewed microscopically
to determine characteristics such as shaft form, hair diameter, and
pigment size.83
Experts have long acknowledged that a positive identification is not
possible with microscopic hair analysis. Instead, examiners testify that
a crime scene exemplar was “consistent with” a hair sample from the
de-fendant. The probative value of this conclusion would, of course,
vary if only a hundred people had microscopically indistinguishable hair
as opposed to several million. Due to a lack of research, no one knows
whether the crime scene hair could have come from 10 other persons or
100, 10,000, and so forth.84 This important qualifying information was

81.

See Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., U.S. DOJ, Meeting #13, at 61–
63 (2017) [hereinafter Meeting #13]; Frank Green, DNA Proves Man
Innocent of 1982 Rape and Murder in Famous ‘Bite-Mark’ Case, Lawyers
Say, Richmond Times-Dispatch (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.richmond.
com/news/dna-proves-man-innocent-of-rape-and-murder-in-famous/article
_05ab68ce-064c-58bb-b57a-211e2bb51ecd.html [https://perma.cc/WUW43R57] (discussing the Keith Harward case); Spencer S. Hsu, Va. Exoneration
Underscores Mounting Challenges to Bite-Mark Evidence, Wash. Post
(Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/vaexoneration-underscores-to-mounting-challenges-to-bite-mark-evidence/
2016/04/08/55bbfe98-fd9a-11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.html?utm_term
=.262f4d5c302d [https://perma.cc/263G-QK5E] (same).

82.

Meeting #13, supra note 81, at 111; e.g., Pema Levy, Sessions’ New
Forensic Science Adviser Has a History of Opposing Pro-Science Reforms,
Mother Jones (Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/crimejustice/2017/08/sessions-new-forensic-science-adviser-has-a-history-of-opposin
g-pro-science-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/R3AR-DJSQ].

83.

See generally 2 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, § 24.02[l] (discussing the
techniques used to identify the human source of a hair sample, including
conventional microscopy).

84.

As one hair examiner wrote, “[i]f a pubic hair from the scene of a crime is
found to be similar to those from a known source, [the courts] do not know
whether the chances that it could have originated from another source are
one in two or one in a billion.” B.D. Gaudette, Probabilities and Human
Pubic Hair Comparisons, 21 J. Forensic Sci. 514, 514 (1976).
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often omitted from the experts’ testimony, thus making marginal evidence appear misleadingly convincing.85
Experts frequently went way beyond the “consistent with” language
in their testimony, however, often suggesting a rare association. For example, in the Edward Honaker case, the expert testified that the crime
scene hair sample “was unlikely to match anyone” other than the
defendant.86 Honaker spent ten years in prison before DNA proved him
innocent.87 In another case, an expert testified that matching hair
samples were “consistent microscopically” but then elaborated: “In other words, hairs are not an absolute identification, but they either came
from this individual or there is—could be another individual somewhere
in the world that would have the same characteristics to their hair.”88
This is an implicit—and extreme—probability statement that lacks any
empirical support.
Although microscopic hair analysis had long been judicially accepted,89 its validity was suspect.90 In 1995, a federal district court in
85.

Professor Berger explained the problem:
We allow eyewitnesses to testify that the person fleeing the scene
wore a yellow jacket and permit proof that a defendant owned a
yellow jacket without establishing the background rate of yellow
jackets in the community. Jurors understand, however, that others
than the accused own yellow jackets. When experts testify about
samples matching in every respect, the jurors may be oblivious to
the probability concerns if no background rate is offered, or may be
unduly prejudiced or confused if the probability of a match is
confused with the probability of guilt, or if a background rate is
offered that does not have an adequate scientific foundation.
Berger, supra note 22, at 1357.

86.

Edward Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by
Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish
Innocence After Trial 58 (1996).

87.

Id. at 59.

88.

Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1554 (E.D. Okla. 1995)
(emphasis added), rev’d sub nom. Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523
(10th Cir. 1997) (holding that due process—not Daubert—controls in federal
habeas review).

89.

See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Hair Analysis: The Case Against the
Underemployment of Scientific Evidence, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 41, 62
(1982) (stating that “[t]he massive body of case law, liberally admitting even
hair evidence of low probative value, dwarfs the handful of cases excluding
hair evidence”).

90.

See Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair
Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century
Snake Oil?, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 227, 231 (1996) (“If the
purveyors of this dubious science cannot do a better job of validating hair
analysis than they have done so far, forensic hair comparison analysis should
be excluded altogether from criminal trials.”).
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Williamson v. Reynolds91 observed: “Although the hair expert may have
followed procedures accepted in the community of hair experts, the
human hair comparison results in this case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable.”92 The court also noted that the “expert did not
explain which of the ‘approximately’ 25 characteristics were consistent,
any standards for determining whether the samples were consistent,
how many persons could be expected to share this same combination of
characteristics, or how he arrived at his conclusions.”93 Williamson, who
was five days from execution when the district court issued a stay, was
subsequently exonerated by DNA testing.94
The Williamson opinion—perhaps the only thorough judicial analysis of microscopic hair comparisons—was all but ignored by other
courts. In 1999 in Johnson v. Commonwealth,95 the Kentucky Supreme
Court upheld the admissibility of hair evidence, taking “judicial notice”
of its reliability96 and thus implicitly finding its validity indisputable.97
Other courts echoed Johnson, not Williamson.98 Indeed, ten years after
Williamson was decided, a 2005 decision by the Connecticut Supreme
Court observed—correctly—that “[t]he overwhelming majority of
courts have deemed such evidence admissible.”99
Once again, the courts abdicated their responsibility. Indeed, hair
evidence only began to be carefully scrutinized after a startling number
of DNA exonerations were reported.100 A 2008 study of 200 DNA
91.

904 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995), rev’d sub nom. Williamson v. Ward,
110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997).

92.

Id. at 1558.

93.

Id. at 1554.

94.

See Jim Dwyer et al., Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution
and Other Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted 146 (2000)
(noting that the hair evidence was shown to be “patently unreliable”). See
also John Grisham, The Innocent Man: Murder and Injustice in a
Small Town 166–87 (2006) (examining Williamson’s trial, including the
role played by hair analysis).

95.

12 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 1999).

96.

Id. at 263.

97.

See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (limiting judicial notice to a “fact that is not
subject to reasonable dispute”).

98.

See 2 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, § 24.03, at 825 (noting the “limited
impact of Daubert”).

99.

State v. West, 877 A.2d 787, 808 (Conn. 2005).

100. In 1998, a Canadian judicial inquiry into the wrongful conviction of Guy
Paul Morin was released. Morin’s original conviction was based, in part, on
hair evidence. The judge conducting the inquiry recommended that “[t]rial
judges should undertake a more critical analysis of the admissibility of hair
comparison evidence as circumstantial evidence of guilt.” Fred Kaufman,
Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Kaufman
Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin 312 (1998);
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exonerations found that forensic evidence was the second leading type
of evidence, at 57 percent—after eyewitness identifications at 79
percent—used in wrongful conviction cases.101 A subsequent
investigation of trial transcripts underscored the role of hair analysis in
the exoneration cases: “Of the 65 cases involving microscopic hair comparison in which transcripts were located, 25 cases, or 38%, had invalid
forensic science testimony.”102 The 2009 NAS Report observed that
“testimony linking microscopic hair analysis with particular defendants
is highly unreliable.”103
1. FBI Hair Review

In April 2013, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision, rejected Willie Jerome Manning’s request for a stay of
execution to permit DNA testing—“potentially setting up what experts
said would be a rare case in recent years in which a person is put to
death with such requests unmet.”104 A week later, the court unexpectedly stayed Manning’s execution after the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) notified state officials that FBI experts had presented misleading testimony at his trial, including hair and firearms evidence.105
Soon after, the DOJ announced that Manning was but one of 120
cases—including twenty-seven death penalty prosecutions—in which
improper microscopic hair analysis had been introduced in evidence.106
see also Edward Connors et al., supra note 86, at 3334–76 (discussing
cases in which hair samples played a role in convicting defendants who were
later exonerated by DNA evidence).
101. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 81
(2008).
102. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony
and Wrongful Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1, 14–15 (2009).
103. NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 161.
104. Campbell Robertson, Mississippi Inmate’s Bid for DNA Tests Is Denied with
Tuesday Execution Set, N.Y. Times (May 3, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/05/04/us/dna-tests-rejected-for-inmate-facing-tuesdayexecution.html [https://perma.cc/58JT-VN35]; see also Andrew Cohen, A
Ghost of Mississippi: The Willie Manning Capital Case, Atlantic (May 2,
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/05/a-ghost-ofmississippi-the-willie-manning-capital-case/275442/ [https://perma.cc/Q72
4-2K7U].
105. See Campbell Robertson, With Hours to Go, Execution Is Postponed, N.Y.
Times (May 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/us/willie-jmanning-granted-stay-of-execution.html
[https://perma.cc/J84G-LPX2]
(noting that the DOJ “disavow[ed] the degree of certainty expressed by
F.B.I. forensic experts at the man’s trial”).
106. See Jack Nicas, Flawed Evidence Under a Microscope: Disputed Forensic
Techniques Draw Fresh Scrutiny; FBI Says It Is Reviewing Thousands of
Convictions, Wall St. J. (July 18, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
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For example, examiners claimed to connect a hair sample to a single
person “to the exclusion of all others” or stated or suggested a probability for such a match from past casework.107 The FBI review came
after three District of Columbia men, who had been convicted of rape
or murder in the early 1980s, were exonerated through DNA testing.108
In one of these cases, the prosecutor claimed that, based on an FBI expert’s testimony, the chances that the sample came from someone else
were “one in 10 million.”109
After further investigation, DOJ reported in 2015 that “FBI examiners had provided scientifically invalid testimony in more than 95
percent of cases where that testimony was used to inculpate a defendant
at trial.”110 Commonwealth v. Perrot111 was one of the first cases to reach
the courtroom as a consequence of the DOJ review. A superior court
granted Perrot a new trial in 2016, criticizing the misleading use of hair
evidence. The court noted: “In discussing the ‘microscopic characteristics’ of hair, [the expert] stated that these characteristics ‘make
that hair somewhat unique.’ He likened the ‘subtle’ characteristics of
SB10001424127887324263404578614161262653152
N-MRCZ].

[https://perma.cc/37W

107. Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. Reviewing 27 Death Penalty Convictions for FBI
Forensic Testimony Errors, Wash. Post (July 17, 2013), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/crime/us-reviewing-27-death-penalty-convictionsfor-fbi-forensic-testimony-errors/2013/07/17/6c75a0a4-bd9b-11e2-89c9-3be80
95fe767_story.html?utm_term=.d9ec6013dda8 [https://perma.cc/53Y4C9MS] (“[O]n the witness stand, several agents for years went beyond the
science and testified that their hair analysis was a near-certain match.”).
108. See Editorial, FBI Lab Failures Should Lead to Reform, Wash. Post (Apr.
20,
2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fbi-lab-failuresshould-lead-to-reform/2012/04/20/gIQAe6lYWT_story.html?utm_term=.
13c701fdc3c6 [https://perma.cc/637M-HY97] (“Kirk L. Odom was
incarcerated for 20 years and Donald E. Gates for nearly 30 for crimes they
did not commit. Santae A. Tribble spent 28 years behind bars, even though
DNA evidence now shows he almost undoubtedly was not the culprit.”).
109. Martin Enserink, Evidence on Trial, 351 Sci. 1129, 1129 (Mar. 11, 2016),
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/351/6278/1128.full.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6LXB-BR7B]. The prosecutor misstated the expert’s testimony.
110. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 3; see also Editorial,
Junk Science at the F.B.I., N.Y. Times (Apr. 27, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/opinion/junk-science-at-the-fbi.html [https:
//perma.cc/L5A3-THN2] (noting “a sweeping post-conviction review of
2,500 cases in which its hair-sample lab reported a match”); Hugh B. Kaplan,
DOJ Examiners Gave Bad Testimony in 90 Percent of Hair Comparison
Cases, 97 Crim. L. Rpt. 77, 77 (2015) (“[T]he review has revealed that FBI
examiners made erroneous statements in 90 percent of the cases that have
been re-examined so far.”).
111. Nos. 85–5415, 5416, 5418, 5420, 5425, 2016 WL 380123 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Jan. 26, 2016).
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hair that ‘make it somewhat unique’ to the subtle differences in a
human face.”112
2. White House PCAST Report (2016)

In June 2016, the DOJ released proposed guidelines concerning hair
testimony. Documentation purporting to support the validity and reliability of hair evidence accompanied the guidelines.113 Listing several
studies, the FBI concluded:
Based on these and other published studies, microscopic hair
comparison has been demonstrated to be a valid and reliable
scientific methodology. These studies have also shown that
microscopic hair comparisons alone cannot lead to personal
identification and it is crucial that this limitation be conveyed
both in the written report and in testimony.114

The White House PCAST Report, however, challenged the supporting documentation, which discussed only a handful of studies from the
1970s and 1980s but did not comment on subsequent studies that found
“substantial flaws in the methodology and results of the key papers.”115
Moreover, “PCAST’s own review of the cited papers [found] that these
studies do not establish the foundational validity and reliability of hair
analysis.”116
112. Id. at *32. The court also noted:
[The expert] asserted that the hairs “matched” and showed a “strong
association.” In discussing the chance that the hair found on the
victim’s bed came from someone other than Perrot, [the expert]
conceded the possibility, adding that during his ten years of
experience “it’s extremely rare that I will have known hair samples
from two different people that I can’t tell apart.” [The expert] made
these statements of confidence, despite being unable to recall at trial
the length or diameter of the one hair found on the bed.
Id.
113. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, DOJ, Justice Department Issues Draft
Guidance Regarding Expert Testimony and Lab Reports in Forensic Science
(June 3, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issuesdraft-guidance-regarding-expert-testimony-and-lab-reports-forensic [https://
perma.cc/T3BK-5P9Q]. These documents are known as the Uniform
Language for Testimony and Reports. Id.
114. DOJ, Supporting Documentation for Department of Justice
Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the
Forensic Hair Examination Discipline 4 (2016) [hereinafter DOJ
Supporting Documentation], https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/
file/877736/download [https://perma.cc/79FV-GCSK].
115. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 13.
116. Id. DOJ cited Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic
and Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. Forensic Scis. 964
(2002). DOJ Supporting Documentation, supra note 114, at 8. This FBI
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The bottom line, again, is the judiciary’s dereliction in failing to
curb the misuse of hair microscopy testimony. The Innocence Project’s
track record of DNA exonerations brought this issue to the fore. Indeed,
the three exonerations in the District of Columbia triggered the FBI review. Yet, DOJ’s proposed guidelines were based on “foundational
research” that PCAST questioned.
C.

Arson Investigations

For decades, arson investigators came from the “old school” of
investigators—those who used intuition and a number of rules of thumb
to determine whether a fire was incendiary. Critics complained that instead of being rooted in science, the approach was based on folklore
that had been passed down from generation to generation—without any
empirical testing.117 A government report noted, as early as 1977, that
common arson indicators had “received little or no scientific testing”
and that “[t]here appears to be no published material in the scientific
literature to substantiate their validity.”118 Proponents of a sciencebased approach to arson investigations waged an uphill battle through
the 1980s, finally winning a major victory when the National Fire
Protection Association (“NFPA”) published its Guide for Fire and
Explosion Investigations (“NFPA 921”) in 1992.119
1. Willingham Case

Although NFPA 921 would later become the bible for arson
investigations,120 Cameron Todd Willingham was convicted for the
study used mitochondrial DNA analysis to re-examine samples from previous
FBI microscopic hair examination cases. Houck & Budowle, supra, at 964.
The PCAST Report did not accept that this study supported validity and
reliability because the study showed that in nine of eighty cases—11
percent—the microscopic examination found the hair indistinguishable but
DNA analysis showed that the hairs came from different individuals. White
House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 28.
117. See John J. Lentini, Scientific Protocols for Fire Investigation
471–505 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing myths of arson investigations); Paul C.
Giannelli, Junk Science and the Execution of an Innocent Man, 7 N.Y.U.
J.L. & Liberty 221, 225 (2013).
118. John F. Boudreau et al., Nat’l Inst. of Law Enf’t & Criminal
Justice, DOJ, Arson and Arson Investigation: Survey and
Assessment 88 (1977).
119. Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n, NFPA 921: Guide for Fire and Explosion
Investigations, 2017 Edition 1 (2016) [hereinafter NFPA 921]. The
NFPA promotes fire prevention and safety. Id.; see also Giannelli, supra note
117.
120. See United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 109 n.39 (D. Mass. 2010)
(“NFPA 921 . . . is widely accepted as the standard guide in the field of fire
investigation.”); Thomas R. May, Fire Pattern Analysis, Junk Science, Old
Wives Tales, and Ipse Dixit: Emerging Forensic 3D Imaging Technologies
to the Rescue?, 16 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1, 5 (2010) (noting that NFPA 921
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arson-murders of his young children weeks before the guide was
published. Willingham, who was executed twelve years later, is the
poster boy for junk science in arson investigations.121
At trial, Deputy Fire Marshall Vasquez testified that “[t]he fire tells
a story. I am just the interpreter . . . . And the fire does not lie. It tells
me the truth.”122 He also testified that he had found numerous so-called
“indicators” for arson during his post-fire investigation of Willingham’s
house.123 One such indicator was a low burning fire.124 He told the jury
that “[a]ll fire goes up,”125 and thus, burn patterns on the floor and
lower walls suggested that an accelerant was used.126 This reasonable

has “become the de facto national standard for fire scene examination and
analysis”).
121. See Frontline: Death by Fire (PBS television broadcast Oct. 19, 2010)
(detailing the case of Cameron Todd Willingham); David Grann, Trial by
Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, New Yorker (Sept. 7, 2009),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/07/trial-by-fire [https://
perma.cc/Z5PU-P7BS] (noting that after Willingham’s execution, the
Innocence Project commissioned a panel of fire experts that, after reviewing
the evidence supporting the conviction, “concluded that ‘each and every one’
of the indicators of arson had been ‘scientifically proven to be invalid’”);
Hall, supra note 70 (“The 893-page report [on the Willingham case], released
in April 2011, was anticlimactic for people looking for proof that Texas had
executed an innocent man.”); Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Texas Man
Executed on Disproved Forensics: Fire that Killed His 3 Children Could
Have Been Accidental, Chi. Trib. (Dec. 9, 2004), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2004-12-09/news/0412090169_1_cameron-todd-willingh
am-arson-fire-fire-scene [https://perma.cc/2CLW-25SK] (“[The fire
investigators] used rules of thumb that have since been shown to be false.
There was no evidence to support a conclusion that the fire was
intentionally set. Just an unsupported opinion.”).
122. Statement of Facts at vol. XI, 244, State v. Willingham, No. 24,467-CR
(Dist. Ct. Navarro Cty., Tex. 1992) [hereinafter Willingham Transcript],
aff’d, 897 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc).
123. See id. at 224–68 (recording the direct examination of Manuel Vasquez). A
second expert’s testimony essentially tracked Vasquez’s. See id. at 156–85
(recording the testimony of Douglas Fogg).
124. Id. at 248. Vasquez testified that there was “char burning, like, for example,
this is the bottom here. It’s burned down here at the bottom. That is an
indicator in my investigation of an origin of fire because it’s the lowest part
of the fire.” Id. at 239; see also Willingham, 897 S.W.2d at 354 (“An expert
witness for the State testified that the floors, front threshold, and front
concrete porch were burned, which only occurs when an accelerant has been
used to purposely burn these areas. This witness further testified that this
igniting of the floors and thresholds is typically employed to impede firemen
in their rescue attempts.”).
125. Willingham Transcript, supra note 122, at vol. XI, 232.
126. Id. at 256 (“So when I found that the floor is hotter than the ceiling, that’s
backwards, upside down. It shouldn’t be like that. The only reason that the
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notion, however, has its limitations—especially when a fire occurs in a
contained area, such as a house with its windows shut:
Due to buoyancy, a thermal plume initially rises once a fire is
ignited. As the fire continues, the plume reaches the ceiling, which
causes it to spread outward towards the walls. When it reaches
the walls, the combustion products press down from the ceiling
creating an upper level, which continues to increase in depth and
temperature. Eventually thermal radiation replaces convection as
the principal method of heat transfer.127

At this point, every combustible surface in the room will spontaneously burst into flames. This transition phenomenon, known as the
onset of “flashover,” can occur within minutes.128 After flashover, the
entire room is burning, including the lower walls and floor. Flashover
has been described as the point at which the fire transitions from a “fire
in a room” to a “room on fire.”129 At trial, prosecution witnesses acknowledged that there was an explosion, which could be explained by
flashover.130 Consequently, a low burning fire is not necessarily
indicative of the use of an accelerant.131
Moreover, many of Vasquez’s other “indicators”—including what
he called “pour patterns” and “puddle configurations,”132 which appear
as splotchy areas on the floor—can appear after flashover in an accidental fire.133 Additional indicators, such as alligatoring—large shiny
floor is hotter is because there was an accelerant.”); see also Giannelli, supra
note 117, at 226.
127. Giannelli, supra note 117, at 227.
128. Id.
129. Lentini, supra note 117, at 77.
130. See Willingham Transcript, supra note 122, at vol. XI, 75 (testimony of
Mary Diane Barbe) (“The windows, the electricity started crackling and
popping, and the top of the—well, I was facing the side of the house, and it
just blew out. The flames just blew out . . . . All the windows and the front
room was engulfed.”); id. at 96 (testimony of Brandy Barbe) (“We was
running towards the house, me and my mother, we was fixing to go and try
to get in, and that’s when it was an explosion . . . .”). Vasquez mentioned
flashover in his testimony, but he did not appear to understand its
implications. See id. at vol XII, 47–48.
131. Paul C. Giannelli & Kimberly Gawel, Arson Evidence, 47 Crim. L. Bull.
1241, 1250–51 (2011) (identifying “flashover” as an alternative reason for
“low burning” fires).
132. Willingham Transcript, supra note 122, at vol. XI, 244–45 (“You can see
that on the burnt patterns on this puddle configuration on Exhibit No. 36.
This is a strong indicator of a liquid. . . . [The sunlight] just lights up the
puddle configurations, the burnt trailers, the pour patterns on that floor.”).
133. Giannelli & Gawel, supra note 131, at 1242–44.
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charred blisters on burned wood—can also be explained by flashover.134
The flashover phenomenon also accounts for another fact that Vasquez
thought incriminatory. Willingham told investigators that he had
attempted to save his daughters, but he was forced to run from his
home without shoes because the heat was too great. According to
Vasquez, the burn debris on the floor made it impossible that
Willingham would not have had burns on his feet.135 However,
Willingham’s feet would not have been burnt if he left his home before
flashover.136
Charring under an aluminum threshold of an interior door provided
another clue according to Vasquez.137 But again, this “indicator” may
occur in a flashover. Other perceived “indicators”—melted bed
springs,138 multiple points of origins,139 and brown stains on a concrete
floor140—were also consistent with an accidental fire.141 Finally, Vasquez
relied on the presence of “crazed glass”—spider-web patterns on the

134. Id. at 1246.
135. “There was fire on the floor . . . . He had no injuries on his feet.” Willingham
Transcript, supra note 122, at 267.
136. Giannelli, supra note 127, at 228.
137. Willingham Transcript, supra note 122, at 251.
138. “[T]he springs were burned from underneath. This indicates there was a fire
under this bed because of the burn underneath the bed.” Id. at 241.
139. Id. at 255 (“Multiple areas of origin indicate—especially if there is no
connecting path, that they were intentionally set by human hands.”). There
are two problems here. First, there could have been one origin, according to
independent experts. Douglas J. Carpenter et al., Report on the
Peer Review of the Expert Testimony in the Cases of State of
Texas v. Cameron Todd Willingham and State of Texas v. Ernest
Ray Willis 12 (2006). Second, even if the fire scene had shown multiple
points of origin, this would not necessarily indicate an intentional fire.
Lentini, supra note 117, at 513–14.
140. Willingham Transcript, supra note 122, at vol. XI, 248–49. Fire experts
reviewing the evidence from Willingham’s trial pointed out that “[t]he
behavior of concrete in fires, including the development of various colors, has
been extensively studied.” Carpenter et al., supra note 139, at 18. These
experts concluded that there is simply “no scientific basis for Mr. Vasquez’s
statement about the brown discoloration being an indication of the presence
of accelerants.” Id.
141. Vasquez’s testimony also demonstrated other misconceptions. A common
one is that arson fires burn hotter and faster than “normal” fires: “You know,
[an accelerant] makes the fire hotter. It’s not a normal fire.” Willingham
Transcript, supra note 122, at vol. XI, 249. However, the temperature of
burning wood and burning gasoline are nearly identical, so to claim that a
fire using liquid accelerants burns “hotter” than a wood fire is wrong.
Lentini, supra note 117, at 501–02.
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windows—as an indication of arson.142 Arson investigators long believed
that crazed glass resulted from a fire that burned fast and hot and that
the presence of crazed glass indicated that the fire was fueled by a liquid
accelerant. Yet, subsequent research demonstrated that crazing occurs
from rapid cooling—rather than rapid heating—when water from fire
hoses is sprayed on heated windows.143
In retrospect, one of the numerous debris samples submitted for
laboratory analysis contributed the most damning piece of evidence.144
The debris sample—collected from an area near the front door—was
the only sample that tested positive for a chemical commonly used in
charcoal lighter fluids.145 This finding can be explained by the fact that
a charcoal grill and lighter fluid were on the front porch at the time of
the fire.146 In fact, that the other samples yielded negative results supported Willingham’s case.147
Numerous nationally recognized experts reviewed the arson
testimony presented at Willingham’s trial and found it seriously flawed.
The first examination of the record by an independent expert was part
of Willingham’s petition for habeas corpus and was also submitted to
the governor and the Board of Pardons and Parole days before
Willingham’s execution. It concluded: “On first reading, a contemporary fire origin and cause analyst might well wonder how anyone
142. “The pieces of broken window glass on the ledge of the north windows to
the northeast bedroom disclosed a crazed ‘spider webbing’ condition. This
condition is an indication that the fire burned fast and hot.” Carpenter et
al., supra note 139, at 18 (citing Vasquez’s written report on the Willingham
fire at 4).
143. Lentini, supra note 117, at 478 (“It is unclear why anyone ever thought
that crazing of glass indicated rapid heating.”).
144. In closing argument, the defense counsel referred to a “dozen samples.”
Willingham Transcript supra note 122, at vol. XIII, 20.
145. Id. at vol. XI, 220–21 (documenting testimony by expert stating there was
“no distinguishing characteristic” in the charcoal lighter fluid from plastic
container on porch “that was not present” in the front-door threshold sample
tested); id. at vol. XIII, 20–21 (“They sent [the samples] to the lab and what
did they find? Nothing, not a trace of anything at all except on the very
front of the front porch where the charcoal lighter fluid was.”); id. at vol.
XIII, 45 ( “The [accelerant] is gone, except [on] the threshold; it burned
away . . . .”).
146. Id. at vol. XII, 14–15 (noting that, although photographs show a grill,
Vasquez apparently did not know of the grill’s presence); id. at vol. XII, 16
(acknowledging that a fire-damaged charcoal lighter fluid container was
found on the front porch).
147. The prosecutor would later say that he “‘never did understand why they
weren’t able to recover’ positive tests in these parts.” Grann, supra note 121.
At trial, he argued that, except in the threshold, the “liquid . . . burned away
in that destructive madness created by Cameron Todd Willingham.”
Willingham Transcript, supra note 122, at vol. XIII, 45.
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could make so many critical errors in interpreting the evidence.”148
Nevertheless, a stay was denied, and Willingham was put to death.
Subsequent evaluators agreed that the trial evidence was junk science.
For example, five independent experts prepared a forty-three-page report, finding that “each and every one of the indicators relied upon
have since been scientifically proven to be invalid.”149
In May 2006, the Innocence Project petitioned the Texas Forensic
Science Commission to review the arson testimony in Willingham’s and
Ernest Ray Willis’ cases.150 The TFSC is not authorized to determine
guilt or innocence. Instead, the Innocence Project argued that the State
Fire Marshall Office should have reinvestigated arson cases in which its
experts testified after NFPA 921 was published in 1992—a full twelve
years before Willingham’s execution.151 TFSC retained its own independent consultant, Dr. Craig Beyler, another nationally-recognized
expert, to review the arson evidence. His fifty-one-page report dissected
the expert testimony, concluding:
The investigations of the Willis and Willingham fires did not
comport with either the modern standard of care expressed by
NFPA 921, or the standard of care expressed by fire investigation
texts and papers in the period 1980-1992. The investigators had
poor understandings of fire science and failed to acknowledge or
apply the contemporaneous understanding of the limitations of
fire indicators. Their methodologies did not comport with the
scientific method or the process of elimination. A finding of arson
could not be sustained based upon the standard of care expressed
by NFPA 921, or the standard of care expressed by fire
investigation texts and papers in the period 1980–1992.152

148. Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst at 1, Ex parte Willingham, No. 24,4670(B), (Dist.
Ct. Navarro Cty., Tex., Feb. 13, 2004).
149. Carpenter et al., supra note 139, at 3.
150. The expert evidence in both cases was comparable, but Willis was lucky. His
death penalty conviction was overturned on procedural grounds, and the
prosecutor subsequently refused to reindict him after Dr. Hurst wrote the
same type of critical report in Willis’s case that he had written in
Willingham’s. Willis, who had spent seventeen years on death row, was
subsequently exonerated on actual innocence grounds. See Mary Alice
Robbins, New-York Based Innocence Project Attacks Texas Arson
Convictions, Tex. Law., May 8, 2006, Factiva, Doc. No.
TEXASL0020060508e2580000l.
151. See Letter from Innocence Project to Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n (Aug. 20,
2010) (on file with Case Western Reserve Law Review).
152. Craig L. Beyler, Analysis of the Fire Investigation Methods and Procedures
Used in the Criminal Arson Cases Against Ernest Ray Willis and Cameron
Todd Willingham 51 (Aug. 17, 2009) (unpublished report) (on file with Case
Western Reserve Law Review).
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Once Beyler’s report became public, a political firestorm erupted,
and the governor, who was in the midst of a reelection battle, abruptly
replaced commission members two days before a meeting was scheduled
to consider the Beyler report.153 The newly appointed chair, a prosecutor, promptly cancelled the meeting,154 raising the specter of a coverup.155 Next, the Attorney General issued an opinion finding that the
TFSC was prohibited “from considering or evaluating specific items of
evidence that were tested or offered into evidence prior to [its creation
in 2005].”156
The TFSC eventually produced a report—one that did not directly
deal with the Willingham and Willis cases. Nevertheless, the Report’s
recommendations and statements indicated that the Willingham arson
153. See Christy Hoppe, Perry Defends Removal of 3 Before Arson Hearing,
Dall. Morning News (Oct. 2, 2009), https://eji.org/sites/default/files/dpdallasmorning-perry-defends-removal-of-3-before-arson-hearing-10-02-09.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DRP9-ZZE6] (detailing the removal of the three members
of the Texas Forensic Science Commission); Mary Alice Robbins, Fired Up;
Changes Sought for Texas Forensic Science Commission at Center of Heated
Controversy, Tex. Law., Nov. 9, 2009, Factiva, Doc. No.
TEXASL0020091109e5b900002 (“[Former Commissioner] Levy says he
believes ‘things went south’ for the commission after [former Chair] Bassett
released Beyler’s report to the public in August ‘as he was required by law
to do.’”). The meeting was scheduled for October 2, 2009. Agenda, Tex.
Forensic Sci. Comm’n (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.fsc.texas.gov/
sites/default/files/D_100209MeetingAgenda_000.pdf [https://perma.cc/U
C8Z-HQMY].
154. Hoppe, supra note 153 (noting that the new chair was “known as one of the
toughest law-and-order prosecutors in the state”).
155. See Jennifer Emily, Texas Forensic Science Commission Refuses to End
Inquiry into Willingham Arson Case, Dall. Morning News (Sept. 18,
2010), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2010/09/18/Texas-Foren
sic-Science-Commission-refuses-to-5315 [https://perma.cc/3RP5-GSH6]
(“Perry’s replacements were seen by some as a political maneuver intended
to change the outcome of the commission’s decision.”); Christy Hoppe, Perry
Ousts Officials Before Arson Hearing: He’s Assailed as New Chair Delays
Session on Flawed Case that Led to Execution, Dall. Morning News, Oct.
1, 2009, at 1A; Dave Mann, Fire and Innocence, Tex. Observer (Dec. 3,
2009), https://www.texasobserver.org/fire-and-innocence/ [https://perma.
cc/SB7T-AGYB] (“Then in late September, Perry booted three members off
of the Texas Forensic Science Commission, which was investigating the
Willingham and Willis cases, just three days before a crucial hearing on
scientists’ findings. Perry’s new appointees promptly canceled the hearing
and have yet to reschedule it. Even conservative commentators cried coverup, suggesting that Perry, in a tough battle for re-election, was trying to
subvert an investigation that might prove he oversaw the execution of an
innocent man.”).
156. Letter from Greg Abbott, Attorney Gen. of Tex., to the Honorable Nizam
Peerwani, Presiding Officer, Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n (July 29, 2011),
https://texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/50abbott/op/2011/pdf
/ga0866.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SMK-P5MY].

895

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018
Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure

investigation was seriously flawed. Its first recommendation was “that
fire investigators adhere to the standards of NFPA 921.”157 In addition,
the report reviewed a number of arson indicators that were used in the
Willingham and Willis cases. Citing Vasquez’s testimony, the report
undermined his opinions concerning (1) V-patterns as an indicator of
origin, (2) pour patterns, (3) low/deep burning, (4) multiple separate
points of origin, (5) spalling, (6) burn intensity, and (7) crazed glass.158
It also observed that “testimony, such as Vasquez’s response to a question regarding Willingham’s state of mind, is an example of the type of
testimony that experts should avoid as falling outside of their field of
expertise.”159 The report even encouraged lawyers to “aggressively pursue admissibility hearings in arson cases.”160
Despite the opinions of all the independent experts, the State Fire
Marshal vigorously defended its investigation. In a breathtaking letter,
the office asserted that “[i]n reviewing documents and standards in
place then and now, we stand by the original investigator’s report and
conclusions.”161 This left the TFSC incredulous.162
2. Han Tak Lee Case

Unfortunately, Willingham’s case was not an outlier. In the 1989
trial of Han Tak Lee,163 the expert also relied on the old “myths” to
declare the fire incendiary: (1) greater intensity and heat, (2) burn
patterns, (3) alligatoring, (4) melted metal in bed frames, and (5) crazed
157. Report
of
the
Texas
Forensic
Science
Commission:
Willingham/Willis Investigation 39 (2011) [hereinafter TFSC
Report].
158. Id. at 22–28.
159. Id. at 36.
160. Id. at 48.
161. Letter from Paul Maldonado, State Fire Marshal, to Leigh Tomlin, Comm’n
Coordinator, Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n (Aug. 20, 2010) (on file with Case
Western Reserve Law Review) (emphasis added).
162. TFSC Report, supra note 157, at 16 (“This appears to be an untenable
position in light of advances in fire science. The fires in these cases occurred
two decades ago; there are few circumstances in which an investigation could
not be improved with the benefit of twenty years of controlled scientific
experiment and practical experience.”).
163. Lee petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in 2010, based in part on
“inaccurate and unreliable evidence.” Lee v. Tennis, No. 4:CV-08-1972, 2010
WL 3812160, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2010). Although the district court
denied Lee’s petition, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case to
the district court. Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 407–08 (3d Cir. 2012) (“If
Lee’s expert’s independent analysis of the fire scene evidence—applying
principles from new developments in fire science—shows that the fire expert
testimony at Lee’s trial was fundamentally unreliable, then Lee will be
entitled to federal habeas relief on his due process claim.”).
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glass.164 In addition, the investigation was “hobbled by an incomplete
and inaccurate understanding” of flashover.165 After serving twenty-five
years, Lee was released from prison in 2014.166
3. National Fire Protection Association Guidelines

After the publication of NFPA 921 in 1992, the kind of testimony
presented in the Willingham and Lee cases should have vanished from
the courtroom. But arson investigators balked. According to one expert,
“[t]he initial response to NFPA 921 in the fire investigation community
was overwhelmingly negative.”167 Babick v. Berghuis168 is illustrative. In
that case, Andrew Babick was convicted of arson-murder for a 1995
house fire and was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole.169 He later sought habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. In 2010,
the Sixth Circuit rejected these claims.170
In dissent, however, Judge Merritt chastised the defense attorney
for not contesting the arson evidence in “this strange junk science
case.”171 One prosecution expert testified that: (1) char marks on the
porch were evidence of an accelerant, (2) a “line of demarcation” in a
burn pattern on a carpet was “suspicious” because “it should not have
burned the carpeting on these jagged edges,” and (3) the burns were
“not normal” and were “unnatural.”172 Another prosecution expert

164. Lee v. Tennis, Civil No. 4:08-CV-1972, 2014 WL 3894306, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
June 13, 2014), adopted, 2014 WL 3900230 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014), aff’d
sub nom. Lee v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 798 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2015).
165. Id.
166. Mark Hansen, Badly Burned: Long-Held Beliefs About Arson Science Have
Been Debunked After Decades of Misuse and Scores of Wrongful
Convictions, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2015, at 37, 37, 43.
167. Id. at 40.
168. 620 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2010). See generally Marc Price Wolf, Habeas Relief
from Bad Science: Does Federal Habeas Corpus Provide Relief for Prisoners
Possibly Convicted on Misunderstood Fire Science?, 10 Minn. J.L. Sci. &
Tech. 213 (2009) (detailing the shift of the principles in the field of fire
investigation and how past convictions may use habeas relief).
169. Id. at 574.
170. Id. at 580.
171. 620 F.3d at 580, 582–83 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 581 (quoting transcript).
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stated that “low burning” and other “unnatural” patterns indicated the
presence of an accelerant.173 Both experts “testified—in direct contrast
to the NFPA guide—that they were so confident in their reading of
burn patterns that the absence of any laboratory confirmation of
accelerant had no effect on their testimony.”174
4. Dog-Sniff Evidence

More alarming, in Judge Merritt’s view, was dog-sniff evidence.175
The NFPA guide provides: “Research has shown that canines have been
alerted to pyrolysis products that are not produced by an ignitable liquid” and a positive canine alert without laboratory confirmation
“should not be considered validated.”176 The lab tests had not detected
accelerants in the house debris. Yet, a dog handler testified that “his
dog, Samantha, was ‘1000 times’ more effective at detecting fire starters
or liquid accelerants than a laboratory test on burnt material.”177 In
short, the “jury was misled into trusting Samantha over the arson forensic lab.”178
A more recent arson-dog case involved James Hebshie, who was
convicted of arson and mail fraud in 2006. A federal district court
granted his habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel
grounds.179 In the court’s view, if a Daubert hearing had been requested
on the canine evidence, there was a “‘reasonable probability’ that the
Court would have excluded the canine testimony or severely limited
it.”180 Without a challenge from the defense, the dog handler testified

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 580.
176. NFPA 921, supra note 119, § 17.5.4.7 (describing the role of canine
investigations as “assisting with the location and collection of samples” for
laboratory testing).
177. Babick, 620 F.3d at 580.
178. Id. at 581. See also United States v. Myers, No. 3:10-00039, 2010 WL
2723196, at *3–4 (S.D.W. Va. July 8, 2010) (granting motion in limine to
prohibit expert testimony of a canine handler because the alert had not been
confirmed by lab testing, conflicted with the Fire Guide, and did not meet
the Daubert standards).
179. United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 128 (D. Mass. 2010).
180. Id. at 124 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
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that his dog, Billy, “was 97% accurate.”181 Indeed, the handler testified
to “an almost mystical account of Billy’s powers and her unique olfactory capabilities.”182 The court explained:
[The handler] went on and on about what he understood about
Billy, as if his relationship with Billy somehow enhanced the
reliability and probative value of the results—that she was
unique, that he could “read her face,” that he was with her 365
days a year, that he knew her personality, “the way her eyes
shifted,” the ways her ear shifted, etc.183

Moreover, the handler focused on one area as the origin of the fire
and testified that the dog had not alerted anywhere else on the premises. However, the handler had limited the dog’s access to that one
area.184 In addition, a dog’s failure to alert has no evidential value:
“[T]he scientific literature cast doubt on the significance of the dog’s
failure to alert (false negatives) and even raised concerns about canine
‘proficiency’ testing, concerns counsel never raised.”185 Indeed, the term
“accelerant-detection” dog was misleading because the dog is trained to
alert to many common materials that are not accelerants; the site of
the fire was a convenience store which sold lighter fluid and lighters.186
5. Post-Daubert Cases

The courts’ response to bogus arson evidence is mixed.187 It is not
hard to find cases citing discredited arson indicators after Daubert, such

181. Id. at 102; see also Michael E. Kurz et al., Effect of Background Interference
on Accelerant Detection by Canines, 41 J. Forensic Scis. 868, 872 (1996)
(noting the varying levels of reliability in accelerant detection depending on
the substance in question and the canine handler); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co. of Ark. v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512, 518, 520 (Ark. 2000) (affirming the trial
court’s exclusion of a canine handler who sought to testify about “the alleged
superior ability of his canine partner, Benjamin, to detect the presence of
accelerants after a fire . . . [that he could] discriminate between different
types of chemicals,” and that he had an “accuracy rate of 100 percent”).
182. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 93–94.
183. Id. at 120.
184. Id. at 94.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 93, 96–97.
187. 2 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, § 26.07[b], at 1102–03 (“Many appellate
courts continue to routinely accept investigators’ testimony about
experientially-based generalizations . . . .”).
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as pour patterns or puddle configurations,188 melted bedsprings,189 concrete spalling,190 fire load,191 and “fast and hot” burn.192 Decided in 1998,
Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Corp. v. Benfield193 is considered
the “first serious challenge to the ‘old school’ of fire investigators.”194 In
that case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that arson testimony “is subject
188. See, e.g., State v. Allen, No. 22835, 2009 WL 2096295, ¶ 114 (Ohio Ct. App.
July 17, 2009) (noting that investigator testified to “an irregular burn
pattern on the floor which through all my experience and training it appears
to be an irregular pour patterns [sic], an ignitable liquid pour pattern”); State
v. Wolf, 891 N.E.2d 358, 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (noting that a firefighter
testified “he observed ‘pour patterns’ located on the floor throughout the
mobile home; that pour patterns are burnt marks that look like puddles that
result from ignitable liquids . . . being poured out of containers . . .”); Colburn
v. State, 990 So. 2d 206, 209–10 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (“This pour pattern,
[the fire investigator] explained, was indicative of flammable liquid being
poured in the area . . . . On cross-examination [the fire investigator] did
admit that the State Crime Laboratory was unable to identify ignitable
liquids in the three debris samples taken from the pour pattern area.”); State
v. Henderson, 125 P.3d 1132, 1137 (Mont. 2005) (finding that the trial court
“did not err in allowing [a firefighter] to identify in the photographs and
diagrams the pour patterns he had observed at the scene”).
189. Simon v. State, 633 So. 2d 407, 409 (Miss. 1993), vacated, 513 U.S. 956
(1994) (mem.).
190. See, e.g., State v. Amodio, 915 A.2d 569, 576 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007) (“They washed the floor and observed areas of spalling in the concrete
underneath the door. This was an indication that a flammable liquid had
been employed in that area.”); McCord v. Gulf Guar. Life Ins. Co., 698 So.
2d 89, 95 (Miss. 1997) (“The arson investigator . . . testified that he found
five different areas of spalling and concluded arson to be the cause of the
fire.”).
191. See, e.g., Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1200 (Ind. 1999) (noting that a
fire investigator testified that a fire was intentionally set based on several
factors, including that “the fire burned too fast for its fuel load”); Carter v.
State, 516 S.E.2d 556, 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (“[The arson investigator]
deduced there must have been an accelerant or some kind of extra fuel
load.”).
192. See, e.g., People v. Klait, No. 289522, 2010 WL 2076956, at *5 (Mich. Ct.
App. May 25, 2010) (“[B]oth [investigators] testified that they believed,
based on the fast and hot nature of the fire, that it was set intentionally.”);
State v. Walters, 813 P.2d 857, 858 (Idaho 1990) (noting that a fire
investigator testified that “it was a hot, fast fire as opposed to a small or as
opposed to a slow, smoldering fire, yes, the evidence suggests to me that it
was deliberately set”); State v. Cutlip, No. 99-L-149, 2001 WL 687493, at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (noting that a fire department lieutenant testified to
a list of factors including that “the fire was fast and hot” and “that such
observations are typical of a fire started by someone pouring an accelerant
and lighting it”).
193. 140 F.3d 915 (11th Cir. 1998).
194. John J. Lentini, The Evolution of Fire Investigations and Its Impact on
Arson Cases, 27 Crim. Just. 12, 14 (2012).
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to Daubert’s inquiry regarding the reliability of such testimony.”195
Some federal courts after Benfield cited NFPA 921.196 Yet, a 2011 article
on the subject began with the passage: “Fire researchers have shattered
dozens of arson myths in recent years. So why do American courts still
lag behind?”197 And a 2013 survey of 586 public sector fire investigators
found that some myths endure: “Nearly 40 percent did not know that
crazed glass is caused by rapid cooling, not rapid heating. Twenty-three
percent think puddle-shaped burns indicate the use of an accelerant.
Eight percent still believe that alligator blistering implies that a fire
burned fast and hot.”198
The TFSC Report did more than the courts to curb flawed arson
testimony. And it took the execution of an innocent man to trigger that
report.199 In addition, the resistance to change is all-too-familiar: Rules
based on science “were slow to take hold, as veteran investigators clung
to what now are considered disproven theories. In some police and fire
departments, investigators were openly hostile to the updated
science.”200
D.

Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis

For more than three decades, FBI experts testified about Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis (“CBLA”), a technique first used in the
investigation into President Kennedy’s assassination.201 CBLA
compares trace chemicals found in bullets at crime scenes with ammu195. Benfield, 140 F.3d at 920.
196. See e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 394 F.3d 1054, 1058
(8th Cir. 2005) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion where
the court concluded that evidentiary support of arson theory advanced by
experts was inadequate because they did not examine their theory “against
empirical data obtained from fire scene analysis and appropriate testing,” in
violation of NFPA 921); Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844,
850–51 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that cause-and-origin expert’s failure to
properly collect evidence violated NFPA 921).
197. Douglas Starr, Up in Smoke, Discover, Nov. 2011, at 36, 37.
198. Hansen, supra note 166, at 42–43.
199. For a fuller discussion of the Cameron Todd Willingham case, see Giannelli,
supra note 117.
200. See Steve Mills, Convicted Murderer Hopes Latest Fire Science Proves
Innocence, Chi. Trib. (May 18, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/ct-arson-science-adam-gray-met-20150518-story.html [https://perma.
cc/B4XF-FMTN].
201. See generally Erik Randich & Patrick M. Grant, Proper Assessment of the
JFK Assassination Bullet Lead Evidence from Metallurgical and Statistical
Perspectives, 51 J. Forensic Sci. 717 (2006) (discussing the original
analysis of the bullet fragments); Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic
Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement Control of Scientific Research,
2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 53, 81 (2011).
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nition found in a suspect’s possession. This technique was used when
firearms or “ballistics” identification could not be employed. FBI experts used various analytical techniques, first neutron activation analysis (“NAA”), and then inductively coupled plasma-atomic emission
spectrometry (“ICP-AES”), to determine the concentration levels of
seven elements—arsenic, antimony, tin, copper, bismuth, silver, and
cadmium—in the bullet lead alloy of the suspect’s bullets and those
recovered from the crime scene. Statistical tests were then used to
compare the elements in each bullet and determine whether the fragments and suspect’s bullets were “analytically indistinguishable” for
each of the elemental concentration averages. Exactly what the phrase
“analytically indistinguishable” meant was the main issue—i.e., did
such a finding mean that the bullet fragments came from a small or
large universe? Obviously, the probative value of the test results would
differ if only a hundred bullets had the same chemical composition as
opposed to several million.
The published cases revealed disparate and often inconsistent interpretive conclusions provided by FBI experts. In some, experts testified
that two exhibits were “analytically indistinguishable.”202 In other cases,
examiners concluded that samples could have come from the same
“source” or “batch.”203 In still others, they stated that the samples came
from the same source.204 The testimony in numerous cases went much
further and referred to a “box” of ammunition—typically fifty loaded
cartridges, sometimes twenty. For example, two specimens:
(1) Could have come from the same box;205
(2) Could have come from the same box or a box manufactured
on the same day;206
(3) Were consistent with their having come from the same box of
ammunition;207
(4) Probably came from the same box;208 or

202. See Wilkerson v. State, 776 A.2d 685, 689 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
203. See State v. Krummacher, 523 P.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Or. 1974) (en banc).
204. See United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 673–74 (8th Cir. 1996); People v.
Lane, 628 N.E.2d 682, 689–90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
205. See State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Jones v. State,
425 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ind. 1981).
206. See State v. Grube, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Idaho 1994); People v. Johnson,
499 N.E.2d 1355, 1366 (Ill. 1986).
207. See State v. Reynolds, 297 S.E.2d 532, 534 (N.C. 1982).
208. See Bryan v. State, 935 P.2d 338, 360 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
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(5) Must have come from the same box or from another box that
would have been made by the same company on the same day.209

Several other statements that differ appear in the published opinions. An early case reported that the specimens “had come from the
same batch of ammunition: they had been made by the same manufacturer on the same day and at the same hour.”210 One case reports
the expert’s conclusion with a statistic.211 In another case, the expert
used the expressions “such a finding is rare”212 and “a very rare
finding.”213 In still another case, the expert “opined that the same
company produced the bullets at the same time, using the same lead
source. Based upon DOJ records, she opined that an overseas company
called PMC produced the bullets around 1982.”214
1. NAS Bullet Lead Report (2004)

The technique was not seriously challenged until a retired FBI
examiner, William Tobin, began questioning the procedure in scientific

209. See Davis, 103 F.3d at 666 (“An expert testified that such a finding is rare
and that the bullets must have come from the same box or from another box
that would have been made by the same company on the same day.”);
Commonwealth v. Daye, 587 N.E.2d 194, 207 (Mass. 1992); State v. King,
546 S.E.2d 575, 584 (N.C. 2001) (“[The expert] opined that, based on her
lead analysis, the bullets she examined either came from the same box of
cartridges or came from different boxes of the same caliber, manufactured at
the same time.”).
210. Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221, 224 (Alaska 1979) (emphasis added).
211. Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc);
see also Giannelli, supra note 201, at 83 n.200.
212. Davis, 103 F.3d at 666.
213. Id. at 667.
214. People v. Villarta, No. H021354, 2002 WL 66887, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan,
17, 2002). In later years, the testimony became more limited. A 2002 FBI
publication states the conclusion as follows: “Therefore, they likely originated
from the same manufacturer’s source (melt) of lead.” Charles A. Peters, The
Basis for Compositional Bullet Lead Comparisons, Forensic Sci.
Commc’ns (July 2002) (emphasis added), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/
about-us/lab/forensic-science-communications/fsc/july2002/peters.htm [https
://perma.cc/889Y-4TGL]. Testimony to the same effect has also been
proffered. Transcript of Record at 6, Commonwealth v. Wilcox, No.
00CR2727 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Jefferson County Feb. 28, 2002) (trial testimony of
Charles Peters, FBI examiner) (“Well, bullets that are analytically
indistinguishable likely come from the same molten lead sources of lead, uh,
as opposed to bullets that have different composition come from different,
uh, melts of lead.”).
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and legal journals215 as well as in court testimony.216 As a result, the
FBI asked the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) to review the
technique. The 2004 NAS Report undercut the FBI testimony, stating:
“The available data do not support any statement that a crime bullet
came from a particular box of ammunition. In particular, references to
‘boxes’ of ammunition in any form should be avoided as misleading under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.”217 Perhaps the most disturbing case
is State v. Earhart,218 a capital murder case in which the CBLA evidence
apparently played a significant role.219 The transcript contains the following expert testimony: “We can—from my 21 years experience of
doing bullet lead analysis and doing research on boxes of ammunition
down through the years I can determine if bullets came from the same
box of ammunition . . . .”220 However, the NAS Report found that the
215. See Edward J. Imwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis (CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 Okla. City
U. L. Rev. 43 (2003); Erik Randich, Wayne Duefeldt, Wade McLendon &
William Tobin, A Metallurgical Review of the Interpretation of Bullet Lead
Compositional Analysis, 127 Forensic Sci. Int’l 174 (2002); William A.
Tobin & Wayne Duerfeldt, How Probative Is Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis?, Crim. Just., Fall 2002, at 26; Paul C. Giannelli, Comparative
Bullet Lead Analysis: A Retrospective, 47 Crim. L. Bull. 306 (2010).
216. E.g., Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Ky. 2006); Clemons
v. State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1068–70 (Md. 2006); State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329,
339–42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (quoting Tobin’s affidavit
submitted with motion for reconsideration).
217. Comm. on Sci. Assessment of Bullet Lead Elemental Composition
Comparison, Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l Acads.,
Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence 7 (2004)
[hereinafter NAS Report]. The author served on the NAS Committee.
218. 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (“[The expert]
concluded that the likelihood that two .22 caliber bullets came from the same
batch, based on all the .22 bullets made in one year, is approximately .000025
percent, ‘give or take a zero.’ He subsequently acknowledged, however, that
the numbers which he used to reach the .000025 percent statistic failed to
take into account that there are different types of .22 caliber bullets made
each year—.22, .22 long, and .22 long rifle. [The expert] ultimately testified
that there could be several hundred thousand bullets per batch, but with
some variation in the elemental composition within the batch.”).
219. See Earhart v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1062, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Given the
significant role the bullet evidence played in the prosecution’s case, we shall
therefore assume Earhart could have made a sufficient threshold showing
that he was entitled to a defense expert under Texas law.”).
220. Transcript of Record at 5248-49, State v. Earhart, No. 4064, Dist. Ct. Lee
County, 21st Judicial Dist., Texas (testimony of John Riley); see also id. at
5258 (“Well, bullets that are—that have analytically indistinguishable
compositions or compositions that are generally similar typically are found
within the same box of ammunition and that is the case that we have here.
Now, bullets that are the same composition can also be found in other boxes
of ammunition, but it’s most likely those boxes would have been
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amount of bullets that can be produced from a melt “can range from
the equivalent of as few as 12,000 to as many as 35 million 40-grain,
.22 caliber longrifle bullets . . . .”221 Earhart was executed before the
report was published.222
2. Post-Report Developments

Much of the FBI testimony rested on a database, which the Bureau
had built up over the span of several years. Although the NAS committee frequently asked for this data during its year-long investigation,
the FBI did not turn it over until it was too late to analyze for its
report.223 The two statisticians who served on the NAS committee later
wrote that their subsequent inspection of the data “identified several
peculiarities.”224 First, the database was incomplete. The FBI claimed
to have a “complete data file” of some 71,000+ measurements, but it
only turned over 64,869. Moreover, only ICP-AES’s measurements were
included; a different analytical method—NAA—had been used before
1997. Both techniques measured the same elements, and thus the results
from either technique would have been appropriate for comparison.
Additionally, the numbering system for the bullets was “highly inconsistent and rather unexpected,” suggesting that some bullet measurements were deleted.225 Additionally, “a rough investigation of the
manufactured at the same place on or about the same date.”). But see
testimony of Charles Peters, FBI examiner, Commonwealth v. Wilcox,
Kentucky, Feb. 28, 2002 (testifying during a Daubert hearing: “We have
never testified, to my knowledge, that that bullet came from that box. We’d
never say that. All we are testifying is that bullet, or that victim fragment
or something, the bullet, either came from that box or the many boxes that
were produced at the same time.” Transcript at 1-2 (emphasis added)).
221. NAS Report, supra note 217, at 6.
222. See James Earhart, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., https://deathpenaltyinfo.
org/james-earhart [https://perma.cc/2KUJ-QK7X] (last visited Oct. 15,
2017).
223. See Clifford H. Spiegelman & Karen Kafadar, Data Integrity and the
Scientific Method: The Case of Bullet Lead Data as Forensic Evidence, 19
Chance, no. 2, 2006, at 17, 22 (“During the open sessions of the committee
meetings, the FBI claimed to have a ‘complete data file’ of some 71,000+
measurements. Following repeated requests from the Committee, the FBI
submitted at its last meeting a CD-ROM that contained two data files with
a combined total of 64,869 bullet (not 71,000+) measurement records. This
data set could not be analyzed in time for the release of the report . . . .”);
Giannelli, supra note 215.
224. Spiegelman & Kafadar, supra note 223, at 17, 22.
225. Id. (“[T]he numbering system of the bullets was highly inconsistent and
rather unexpected (e.g., the bullets from a suspect in a particular case might
be numbered Q13A, Q13B, Q13C, Q14A, Q14B, Q14C, . . . leading one to
wonder what happened to bullets Q01, Q02, . . . Q12).” (omissions in
original)). Other illustrations of incomplete data were noted: “[W]hile most
of the bullets indicated three measurements, about 30 bullets had six or more
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measurement error indicated many measurement errors that exceeded
the FBI’s claimed analytical precision of 2–5%.”226 Finally, “only 15%
of the 1,079 cases listed in these two files had measurements from
[National Institute of Standards and Technology] . . . making it
impossible to determine the frequency of matches . . . in a case.”227
Accordingly, the “missing data and the inconsistent precisions” undermined the Bureau’s public claims.228 These authors were puzzled by the
FBI’s failure to disclose data: “The scientific method is important for
science generally; forensic science is no exception. . . . [T]he evidence in
this paper suggests that, at least for [CBLA], forensic science failed in
the requirement to share the material, methods, and data to reach conclusions with the scientific community.”229
The FBI’s response to the NAS Report was also troubling. The
Bureau quickly put out a press release, obscuring the report’s findings.230 The release highlighted the committee’s conclusion that the FBI
was using appropriate instrumentation and suitable elements for comparison. Yet, these aspects of CBLA were never seriously questioned.
Rather, the interpretation of the data was disputed. Only one sentence
in the press release addressed this critical issue: “Recommendations by
the [NAS] included suggestions to improve the statistical analysis, quality control procedures, as well as expert testimony.”231 The news media
read the report quite differently—e.g., “Study Shoots Holes in Bullet
Analyses by FBI,”232 “Report Finds Flaws in FBI Bullet Analysis,”233

measurements. . . . [O]nly about 50% of the bullets in this data set were
identified as having come from one of the four major bullet manufacturers
in the United States [i.e., Cascade Cartridge, Inc.; Federal; Remington;
Winchester]; the ‘complete data file’ of 71,000 bullets may yield a higher
proportion of bullets from these four manufacturers.” Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 24; see also Giannelli, supra note 215.
230. FBI Nat’l Press Office, National Academy of Sciences Releases FBICommissioned Study on Bullet Lead Analysis, FBI (Feb. 10, 2004),
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/national-acade
my-of-sciences-releases-fbi-commissioned-study-on-bullet-lead-analysis [https:
//perma.cc/8SXR-2PSV].
231. Id.
232. Maurice Possley, Study Shoots Holes in Bullet Analyses by FBI, Chi. Trib.
(Feb. 11, 2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-02-11/news/0402
110356_1_bullet-analysis-bullet-lead-analysis-bullet-comparisons [https://
perma.cc/Z59B-UZ5T].
233. Charles Piller, Report Finds Flaws in FBI Bullet Analysis: Changes Are
Proposed for the Technique Often Cited in Expert Testimony in Criminal
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“FBI Lab Under Scrutiny Again,”234 and “Report Questions the
Reliability of an F.B.I. Ballistics Test.”235
The Bureau also included the following passage in the press release:
“The basis of bullet lead compositional analysis is supported by
approximately 50 peer-reviewed articles found in scientific publications
beginning in the early 1970’s. Published research and validation studies
have continued to demonstrate the usefulness of the measurements of
trace elements within bullet lead.”236 In contrast, the NAS Report
pointed out that there were “very few peer-reviewed articles on
homogeneity and the rate of false positive matches” and “[o]utside
reviews have only recently been published.”237
Over a year later, the FBI discontinued CBLA testing 238 and issued
another, similar press release. Once again, the release minimized the
problems, citing the following reason for its decision: “While the FBI
Laboratory still firmly supports the scientific foundation of bullet lead
analysis, given the costs of maintaining the equipment, the resources
necessary to do the examination, and its relative probative value, the
FBI Laboratory has decided that it will no longer conduct this exam.”239
Nevertheless, Dwight Adams, the laboratory director, had written a
private memorandum to the FBI Director a month earlier specifying
different reasons for abandoning the technique, including the following
comments: (1) “We cannot afford to be misleading to a jury” and (2)
“We plan to discourage prosecutors from using our previous results in
future cases.”240 The press release did not reflect either concern.
Trials, L.A. Times (Feb. 11, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/feb/
11/science/sci-bullet11 [https://perma.cc/4QHZ-G4QM].
234. Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, FBI Lab Under Scrutiny Again, Associated
Press (Feb. 10, 2004, 1:26 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-labunder-scrutiny-again/ [https://perma.cc/PG9K-VGWL].
235. Eric Lichtblau, Report Questions the Reliability of an F.B.I. Ballistics Test,
N.Y. Times (Feb. 11, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/11/us/
report-questions-the-reliability-of-an-fbi-ballistics-test.html [https://perma.
cc/N7JC-RF6P].
236. FBI Nat’l Press Office, supra note 230.
237. NAS Report, supra note 217, at 100.
238. Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Abandons Disputed Test for Bullets from Crime
Scenes, N.Y. Times (Sept. 2, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/02/
politics/fbi-abandons-disputed-test-for-bullets-from-crime-scenes.html [https
://perma.cc/4JLF-GCWW].
239. Press Release, FBI, FBI Laboratory Announces Discontinuation of Bullet
Lead Examinations (Sept. 1, 2005), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/
pressrel/press-releases/fbi-laboratory-announces-discontinuation-of-bullet-lead
-examinations [https://perma.cc/QMY5-7MBF]).
240. John Solomon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, Wash. Post (Nov. 18,
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/
17/AR2007111701681.html [https://perma.cc/YGJ2-8ZK4].
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In the wake of the NAS Report, several state courts excluded CBLA
evidence.241 Surprisingly, the FBI supplied affidavits in several cases
supporting prosecutors’ efforts to sustain convictions based on the
technique. In one affidavit, the FBI cited the NAS report but ignored
that the report had faulted the Bureau’s statistical methods. The chair
of the NAS committee criticized the affidavit because it did “not discuss
the statistical bullet-matching technique, which is key and probably the
most significant scientific flaw found by the committee.”242 The affidavit
was also misleading because it estimated that the maximum number of
.22-caliber bullets in a batch of lead was 1.3 million, when the NAS
committee found that the number could be as high as 35 million.243
On November 18, 2007, 60 Minutes aired a segment on CBLA.244 In
an interview, the now-retired FBI lab director acknowledged that
testimony about boxes was “misleading and inappropriate.”245 That
broadcast, along with a Washington Post investigation, questioned the
FBI’s response to the NAS Report. The main problem was that only
the FBI had records of all the cases in which its experts had testified,
and the Bureau had declined to disclose the names of those cases.246
241. See Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Ky. 2006) (noting
that “[i]f the FBI Laboratory that produced the CBLA evidence now
considers such evidence to be of insufficient reliability to justify continuing
to produce it, a finding by the trial court that the evidence is both
scientifically reliable and relevant would be clearly erroneous”); Clemons v.
State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1070, 1078 (Md. 2006) (“CBLA is not admissible under
the Frye-Reed standard because it is not generally accepted within the
scientific community as valid and reliable.”; “Based on the criticism of the
processes and assumptions underlying CBLA, we determine that the trial
court erred in admitting expert testimony based on CBLA because of the
lack of general acceptance of the process in the scientific community.”); State
v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329, 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005) (finding the technique was
“based on erroneous scientific foundations”). But see Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 870 A.2d 864, 871 (Pa. 2005) (“The CBLA evidence, at best,
established a possible connection between Appellant and the bullets
recovered from the victim’s body.”); see also United States v. Davis, 406
F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Davis’s trial counsel cannot be said to be
ineffective for failing to challenge the FBI’s methodology on a basis that was
not advanced by the scientific community at the time of trial.”).
242. John Solomon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, Wash. Post (Nov. 18,
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/
17/AR2007111701681_5.html?sid=ST2007111701983 [https://perma.cc/F
KM4-L4WQ] (quoting Kenneth MacFadden).
243. Id.
244. 60 Minutes: Evidence of Injustice (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 16, 2007),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H4g62cpRz7M [https://perma.cc/XC
7E-E5HP].
245. Id. at 5:26.
246. Solomon, supra note 242 (“Hundreds of defendants sitting in prisons
nationwide have been convicted with the help of an FBI forensic tool that
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Instead, the Bureau relied on the NAS Report, its own press releases,
and pro forma letters sent to prosecution and defense organizations to
notify defendants. This method of communication was grossly inadequate because the letters neither highlighted the problem, nor its significance.247 A few days after the 60 Minutes expose, Senator Patrick
Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, sent a letter
to the FBI Director noting that the Bureau’s letters gave “the false impression that these discredited tests had continuing reliability.”248
Here, the flaws are many: Lack of foundational research, failure to
make a database available to outside scientists, and ignoring the FBI’s
own protocols by presenting inconsistent and misleading testimony.
Moreover, the reluctance to confess error and take timely corrective
action violated basic scientific norms. After decades of use, a federal
district court in 2003 excluded CBLA evidence under the Daubert
standard for the first time.249

II. Misleadingly Presented Techniques
A.

Firearms & Toolmark Identifications

Firearms identifications, popularly known as “ballistics,” is another
long-established forensic discipline. It developed in the early part of the
last century, and by the 1930s courts were admitting evidence based on
this technique. “Subsequent cases have followed these precedents,
admitting evidence of bullet, cartridge case, and shot shell iden-

was discarded more than two years ago. But the FBI lab has yet to take
steps to alert the affected defendants or courts, even as the window for
appealing convictions is closing . . . .”).
247. The Innocence Network and the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers formed a task force and worked with the FBI to contact defense
attorneys and convicts. See Vesna Jaksic, Faulty Bullet-Test Cases Finding
Way to Court, Nat’l L.J. (Feb. 25, 2008), http://lethal-injectionflorida.blogspot.com/2008/02/faulty-bullet-test-cases-finding-way-to.html
[https://perma.cc/PH7J-LTY9] (“The task force is lining up pro bono
commitments from several law firms to handle the cases.”).
248. John Solomon, Leahy Pursues Forensic-Test Answers: Attorney General Is
Told to Prepare For Senate Inquiry, Wash. Post (Nov. 22, 2007),
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post/20071122/2815394
01609068 [https://perma.cc/BKY5-SFFH] (quoting Leahy). Leahy also
wrote: “The new revelations about bullet-lead analysis are just the latest
examples of the Department’s inadequate efforts to ensure that sound
forensic testing is utilized to the maximum extent to find the guilty rather
than merely obtain a conviction. Punishing the innocent is wrong and allows
the guilty party to remain free.” Id.; see also Giannelli, supra note 215.
249. United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137, 2003 WL 22922197, at *4–5 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 9, 2003).
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tifications.”250 Toolmark comparison, a related discipline, was also accepted during this period.251 At the time Daubert was decided, the FBI’s
position was clear: “Firearms identification is the Forensic Science discipline that identifies a bullet, cartridge case or other ammunition component as having been fired by a particular firearm to the exclusion of
all other firearms.”252 Yet, the examination, by means of a comparison
microscope, is subjective and without a meaningful standard.
1. Post-Daubert Cases

The courts gave short shrift to the initial post-Daubert challenges
to firearms and toolmark identifications.253 In 2005, however, the legal
landscape changed abruptly. In United States v. Green,254 the district
judge questioned the foundational basis of firearms identifications. The
court wrote that the expert “declared that this match could be made
‘to the exclusion of every other firearm in the world.’ . . . That conclusion, needless to say, is extraordinary, particularly given [his] data
and methods.”255 Moreover, the expert could not cite any reliable error
rates and admitted that he relied mainly on his subjective judgment.
In addition, “[t]here were no reference materials of any specificity, no
national or even local database on which he relied. And although he
relied on his past experience with these weapons, he had no notes or
pictures memorializing his past observations.”256 In the end, the court
restricted the expert’s testimony; he could only explain the ways in
which the casings were similar but not that they came from a specific
weapon “to the exclusion of every other firearm in the world.”257 In the
court’s view, that conclusion “stretches well beyond [the expert’s] data
and methodology.”258
250. 1 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, § 14.06, at 772 (citations omitted).
251. Id. at § 14.12.
252. FBI Handbook of Forensic Science 57 (rev. ed. 1994) (emphasis added).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating
that “the matching of spent shell casings to the weapon that fired them has
been a recognized method of ballistics testing in this circuit for decades”);
United States v. Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 n.1 (D. Md. 2004)
(“Ballistics evidence has been accepted in criminal cases for many
years. . . . In the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the
reliability of ballistics identification.”); United States v. Santiago, 199 F.
Supp. 2d 101, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The Court has not found a single case
in this Circuit that would suggest that the entire field of ballistics
identification is unreliable.”).
254. 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005).
255. Id. at 107.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 109.
258. Id.
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A few weeks later, a different district judge in United States v.
Monteiro259 found that the technique “is largely a subjective determination based on experience and expertise.”260 Importantly, the court
also concluded that the theory on which the expert relied was “tautological.”261 The Association of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners
(“AFTE”), the leading organization of examiners, proposed the
theory.262 Under this theory, the examiner may declare a positive
identification if (1) there is “sufficient agreement” of marks between the
crime scene and test bullets; and (2) there is “sufficient agreement”
when the examiner says there is.263 In short, the “sufficient agreement”
threshold is “in the minds eye of the examiner and is based largely on
training and experience.”264 The court would not admit the evidence
unless the expert could better document the examination.
Together, Green and Monteiro should have served as a shot across
the bow. But they did not; courts continued to admit the same evidence
as before.265

259. 407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006).
260. Id. at 355.
261. Id. at 370.
262. See Theory of Identification, Association of Firearm and Toolmark
Examiners, 30 AFTE J. 86, 86 (1998).
263. See Itiel E. Dror, How Can Francis Bacon Help Forensic Science? The Four
Idols of Human Biases, 50 Jurimetrics 93, 104 (2009) (“The potential
problem here is the nonscientific nature of the identification criteria. If the
comparison of toolmarks enables conclusions about common origin when the
unique surface contours of two toolmarks are in ‘sufficient agreement,’ what
is the scientific definition and measurement of what constitutes such
‘sufficient agreement’? It seems that it is more in the eye of the beholder
than strict scientific measures because it is determined without specific
quantification and criteria.”).
264. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 370 (quoting Richard Grzybowski et al.,
Firearm/Toolmark Identification: Passing the Reliability Test Under Federal
and State Evidentiary Standards, 25 AFTE J. 209, 213 (2003)).
265. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2007)
(upholding admissibility of firearms identification evidence); United States
v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (“According to his
testimony, these toolmarks were sufficiently similar to allow him to identify
Defendant’s gun as the gun that fired the cartridge found at the crime scene.
He opined that he held this opinion to a 100% degree of certainty. . . . The
Court also finds [the expert’s] opinions reliable and based upon a
scientifically valid methodology. Evidence was presented at the hearing that
the toolmark testing methodology he employed has been tested, has been
subjected to peer review, has an ascertainable error rate, and is generally
accepted in the scientific community.”).
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2. NAS Ballistic Imaging Report (2008)

In 2008, NAS published a report on computer imaging of bullets.266
Although firearms identification was not the primary focus of the
investigation, a section of the report commented on the subject.267 After
surveying the literature on uniqueness, reproducibility, and permanence
of individual characteristics, the report noted that “[m]ost of these
studies are limited in scale and have been conducted by firearms examiners (and examiners in training) in state and local law enforcement
laboratories as adjuncts to their regular casework.”268 The report found
that the “validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and
reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been fully
demonstrated.”269 The report went on to caution:
Conclusions drawn in firearms identification should not be made
to imply the presence of a firm statistical basis when none has
been demonstrated. Specifically . . . examiners tend to cast their
assessments in bold absolutes, commonly asserting that a match
can be made “to the exclusion of all other firearms in the world.”
Such comments cloak an inherently subjective assessment of a
match with an extreme probability statement that has no firm
grounding and unrealistically implies an error rate of zero.270

Citing this report, the district court in United States v. Glynn271
ruled that the expert would only be permitted to testify that it was
“more likely than not” that recovered bullets and cartridge cases came
from a particular weapon.272 The court also commented: “Based on the
Daubert hearings . . . the Court very quickly concluded that whatever
else ballistics identification analysis could be called, it could not fairly
266. Nat’l Research Council of The Nat’l Acads., Ballistic Imaging
(Daniel L. Cork et al. eds., 2008).
267. The committee was asked to assess the feasibility, accuracy, reliability, and
technical capability of developing and using a national ballistic database as
an aid to criminal investigations. It concluded: (1) “A national reference
ballistic image database of all new and imported guns is not advisable at this
time;” and (2) the National Integrated Ballistics Information Network
(NIBIN) “can and should be made more effective through operational and
technological improvements.” Id. at 5, 239.
268. Id. at 70.
269. Id. at 81. The report also stated: “Additional general research on the
uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks would have to
be done if the basic premises of firearms identification are to be put on a
more solid scientific footing.” Id. at 82.
270. Id. at 82.
271. 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
272. Id. at 575.
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be called ‘science.’”273 The court further noted that “[t]he problem is
compounded by the tendency of ballistics experts . . . to make assertions
that their matches are certain beyond all doubt, that the error rate of
their methodology is ‘zero,’ and other such pretensions.”274
3. NAS Forensic Science Report (2009)

As noted previously, NAS issued its forensic report the following
year in 2009. That Report summarized the state of the research as
follows:
Because not enough is known about the variabilities among
individual tools and guns, we are not able to specify how many
points of similarity are necessary for a given level of confidence in
the result. Sufficient studies have not been done to understand
the reliability and repeatability of the methods . . . . Individual
patterns from manufacture or from wear might, in some cases, be
distinctive enough to suggest one particular source, but additional
studies should be performed to make the process of
individualization more precise and repeatable.275

In a different passage, the report—citing firearm and toolmark
identifications—observed that “[m]uch forensic evidence . . . is
introduced in criminal trials without any meaningful scientific validation, determination of error rates, or reliability testing to explain the
limits of the discipline.”276
AFTE rejected these findings out of hand, arguing that NAS
“ignore[d] extensive research supporting the scientific underpinnings of
the identification of firearm and toolmark evidence . . . .”277 The court
in United States v. Otero278 accepted the AFTE’s position, citing studies
which it was ill-equipped to evaluate.279 A subsequent review of the oftcited studies by two scientists concluded:

273. Id. at 570.
274. Id. at 574.
275. NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 154.
276. Id. at 107–08.
277. AFTE Comm. for the Advancement of the Sci. of Firearm and Tool Mark
Identification, The Response of the Association of Firearms and Tool Mark
Examiners to the February 2009 National Academy of Science Report
“Strengthening the Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward”,
41 AFTE J. 204, 206 (2009).
278. 849 F. Supp. 2d 425, 437–38 (D.N.J. 2012) (“The Court’s analysis of the
proposed testimony according to the Daubert factors leads it to conclude
that [the] expert report and opinion are admissible under Rule 702.”).
279. Id. at 438; see also NAS Forensic Report supra note 26, at 153–55.
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Exaggerated and unfounded implications relating to rates of error
inferred from even the best of existing experiments in the field of
firearms/toolmarks, generally self-described as ‘validation
studies’, typically result from statistical, metallurgical and/or
psychological (cognitive) deficiencies in the design and conduct of
the experiments, and frequently lead to unjustified inferential
extrapolation to universal assumption for the practice domain.280

Other courts took an important, but still limited, step of restricting
examiner testimony by precluding the expert from making gross overstatements such as declaring a match to the exclusion, either practical
or absolute, of all other weapons.281 Similarly, some courts forbade
experts from testifying that they hold their opinions to a “reasonable
degree of scientific certitude.”282 That term has long been required by
courts in many jurisdictions for the admission of expert testimony.
Incredibly, the phrase has no scientific meaning and the claim of certainty is unsupported by empirical research. Thus, it is grossly misleading. Indeed, the National Commission on Forensic Science rejected
it.283 Still other courts went off on a quixotic tangent, substituting the
phrase “reasonable degree of ballistic” certitude.284 Changing “scientific
280. Clifford Spiegelman & William A. Tobin, Analysis of Experiments in
Forensic Firearms/Toolmarks Practice Offered as Support for Low Rates of
Practice Error and Claims of Inferential Certainty, 12 Law, Prob. & Risk
115, 115 (2013).
281. See, e.g., United States v. Ashburn, 88 F. Supp. 3d 239, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(“Nor can [the expert] testify that a match he identified is to ‘the exclusion
of all other firearms in the world,’ or that there is a ‘practical impossibility’
that any other gun could have fired the recovered materials.”); United States
v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009) (“[The expert] also will
not be allowed to testify that he can conclude that there is a match to the
exclusion, either practical or absolute, of all other guns.”).
282. See, e.g., Ashburn, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 249 (“[T]he court joins in precluding
this expert witness from testifying that he is ‘certain’ or ‘100%’ sure of his
conclusions that certain items match.”); United States v. Willock, 696 F.
Supp. 2d 536, 549 (D. Md. 2010) (“[The expert] shall state his opinions and
conclusions without any characterization as to the degree of certainty with
which he holds them.”); People v. Robinson, 2 N.E.3d 383, 402 (Ill. App. Ct.
2013) (“[T]he judicial decisions uniformly conclude toolmark and firearms
identification is generally accepted and admissible at trial. Accordingly, we
conclude the trial court did not err in ruling the testimony in this case was
admissible . . . particularly where the trial judge barred the witnesses from
testifying their opinions were ‘within a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty.’”).
283. Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., DOJ, Views Document on Use of
the Term “Reasonable Scientific Certainty” 1 (2016).
284. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (“He may only testify that, in his opinion,
the bullet came from the suspect rifle to within a reasonable degree of
certainty in the firearms examination field.”); United States v. Cerna, No.
CR 08–0730 WHA, 2010 WL 3448528, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (allowing
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certainty” to “ballistic certainty” merely underscores the courts’ scientific incompetence.
However, even these modest limitations were rejected by other
courts.285 For example, in United States v. Casey,286 the district court
declined “to follow sister courts who have limited expert testimony
based upon the 2008 and 2009 NAS reports and, instead, remains faithful to the long-standing tradition of allowing the unfettered testimony
of qualified ballistics experts.”287
4. White House PCAST Report (2016)

The 2016 White House PCAST report agreed with the 2009 NAS
Report’s characterization of the scientific research on firearms and toolmarks identification: “We find that many of these earlier studies were
inappropriately designed to assess foundational validity and estimate
reliability. Indeed, there is internal evidence among the studies themselves indicating that many previous studies underestimated the false
positive rate by at least 100-fold.”288 In addition, PCAST found only
one of the post-2009 studies sufficiently rigorous. The Defense Department’s Forensic Science Center commissioned the study, which was
conducted by an independent testing lab—the Ames Laboratory, a
Department of Energy national laboratory affiliated with Iowa State
University. In this study, “[t]he false-positive rate was estimated at 1
experts “to testify that a particular bullet or cartridge case was fired from a
particular firearm ‘to a reasonable degree of certainty in the ballistics field’”
(quoting United States v. Diaz, No. 05-00167, 2007 WL 485967, at *14 (N.D.
Cal. 2007)); Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 942 N.E.2d 927, 945 (Mass.
2011) (stating that “the expert may offer that opinion to a ‘reasonable degree
of ballistic certainty’”).
285. See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 1 A.3d 572, 590 (Md. Ct. App. 2010)
(“[N]otwithstanding the current debate on the issue, courts have consistently
found the traditional method [of firearms identification] to be generally
accepted within the scientific community, and to be reliable.”); People v.
Givens, 912 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (“This Court was unable to
find any cases where firearms and toolmark identification was found to be
unreliable or no longer scientifically acceptable.”).
286. 928 F. Supp. 2d 397 (D.P.R. 2013).
287. Id. at 400; see also United States v. Sebbern, No. 10 Cr. 87(SLT), 2012 WL
5989813, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012); State v. Langlois, 2 N.E.3d 936,
950 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (“Our conclusion on this issue finds support in the
decisions of other appellate districts in Ohio, notwithstanding the recent
criticisms in scientific reports and the limitations some federal courts have
imposed on the testimony of firearms experts. These decisions hold that the
methodology of comparatively analyzing and testing bullets and shell cases
recovered from crime scenes is reliable.”); State v. Jones, 303 P.3d 1084, at
¶ 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (expert testimony comparing bunter marks on
the base of shell casings found at the crime scene to shell casings found in
Jones’s home admissible under the Frye standard).
288. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 11.
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in 66, with a confidence bound indicating that the rate could be as high
as 1 in 46.”289 The study had not been published in a scientific journal.
According to the PCAST Report, more than one study is required and
studies should be published in peer-reviewed scientific literature.
Consequently, “the current evidence still falls short of the scientific criteria for foundational validity.”290
AFTE quickly retorted, expressing their “disappointment in the
PCAST’s choice to ignore the research that has been conducted” and
claiming that “[d]ecades of validation and proficiency studies have
demonstrated that firearm and toolmark identification is scientifically
valid . . . .”291 However, when PCAST later invited stakeholders to
submit validation studies that it may have overlooked, no studies
satisfying PCAST’s criteria were offered.292
The lessons here are familiar. For years, an entrenched forensic discipline vigorously guarded its turf by rejecting the conclusions of the
outside scientific community.293 It published a journal which was “peerreviewed” by other members of its discipline. The journal, which is advertised as “the Scientific Journal” of AFTE, was not generally available until 2016. The discipline claimed to be a “science” but did not
hold itself to the normative standards of science. The AFTE “Theory
of Identification” is “clearly not a scientific theory, which the National
Academy of Sciences has defined as ‘a comprehensive explanation of
some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence.’ . . . More importantly, the stated method is circular.”294 Only
recently, after two NAS reports, have some courts begun to limit misleading testimony. Many have not. Thus, the courts’ competence to
deal with flawed research remains extant.295
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners Response to PCAST
Report on Forensic Science, 48 AFTE J. 195, 195 (2016).
292. President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. and Tech., An Addendum
to the PCAST Report on Forensic Science in Criminal Courts 7
(2017) (“Several respondents wrote to PCAST concerning firearms analysis.
None cited additional appropriately designed black-box studies similar to the
recent Ames Laboratory study.”).
293. See William A. Tobin et al., Absence of Statistical and Scientific Ethos: The
Common Denominator in Deficient Forensic Practices, 4 Stat. & Pub.
Pol’y 1, 9 (2016) (“[P]ractitioners remain intractable even after years of
critical scholarly papers, ad hoc committees of the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS), position statements from the U.S. Department of
Justice . . . .”) (citation omitted).
294. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 60.
295. Tobin et al., supra note 293, at 9 (“[T]he purported ‘validation studies’
typically proffered to courts are seriously flawed [and] have no external
validity . . . .”).
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In 2005, the district court in Green cautioned: “The more courts
admit this type of toolmark evidence without requiring documentation,
proficiency testing, or evidence of reliability, the more sloppy practices
will endure; we should require more.”296 Over a decade later, a
concurring opinion in Williams v. United States297 concluded: “As matters currently stand, a certainty statement regarding toolmark pattern
matching has the same probative value as the vision of a psychic: it reflects nothing more than the individual’s foundationless faith in what
he believes to be true.”298 In short, there is a “lost decade” during which
the discipline summarily dismissed criticisms when it should have lead
the effort for more rigorous research.
B.

Fingerprint Examinations

Before DNA analysis, fingerprint identification was the “gold
standard” in forensics.299 Like many other forensic disciplines, it gained
judicial acceptance decades before Daubert was decided. People v.
Jennings,300 the first reported fingerprint case, was decided in 1911. In
1984, the FBI pronounced the technique “infallible” in its official
publication, which also referred to the technique as a “science.”301
Nevertheless, it is a subjective technique without an objective standard
and typically involves partial prints with inevitable distortions.
1. Post-Daubert Cases

After Daubert, challenges to fingerprint comparison testimony were
decidedly unsuccessful.302 One infamous case, United States v.

296. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2005).
297. 130 A.3d 343 (D.C. 2016).
298. Id. at 355 (Easterly, J., concurring).
299. See Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic
Science: Progress Amid the Pitfalls, 36 Stetson L. Rev. 621, 654 (2007)
(“The scientific integrity and reliability of DNA testing have helped DNA
replace fingerprinting and made DNA evidence the new ‘gold standard’ of
forensic evidence.”).
300. 96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911). See generally 1 Giannelli et al., supra note 20,
§16 (discussing the scientific and legal issues associated with fingerprint
identification).
301. Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Science of Fingerprints:
Classification and Uses iv (1984).
302. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 682 (8th Cir. 2003)
(“Fingerprint evidence and analysis is generally accepted.”); United States
v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. MartinezCintron, 136 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.P.R. 2001) (discussing how flaws and
difficulties surrounding fingerprint evidence do not exclude the evidence
outright).
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Havvard,303 illustrates the judiciary’s lack of rigor in applying Daubert.
Not only did the district court uphold the fingerprint testimony’s
admissibility, it styled the technique as “the very archetype of reliable
expert testimony under [the Daubert/Kumho] standards.”304 According
to the court, latent print identification had been “tested” for nearly one
hundred years in adversarial proceedings with the highest possible
stakes—liberty and sometimes life. Yet, Daubert required scientific, not
“adversarial,” testing.305 Next, in citing “peer review,” the court noted
that a second fingerprint examiner also compared the prints: “In fact,
peer review is the standard operating procedure among latent print examiners.”306 This statement reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of
“peer review” as used in Daubert. In that case, peer review meant
refereed scientific journals in which validation research is published. An
amici brief submitted in Daubert by the New England Journal of
Medicine and other scientific publications explained that peer review’s
“role is to promote the publication of well-conceived articles so that the
most important review, the consideration of the reported results by the
scientific community, may occur after publication.”307
Moreover, the court accepted the prosecution expert’s astounding
claim that the “error rate for the method is zero.”308 Experts argued
that, while individual examiners may make mistakes, the method itself
is perfect. The dichotomy between “methodological” and “human” error
rates in this context, however, is “practically meaningless”309 because
303. 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
304. Id. at 855; see also Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Challenges to Fingerprints,
42 Crim. L. Bull. 624, 628 (2006).
305. See Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & Pol’y 143, 170 (2005)
(“The argument that no latent print has ever been found to match the rolled
print of a different person is . . . misleading because no systematic search for
such pairs on the entire databank of millions of fingerprints has ever been
performed.”).
306. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
307. Brief of the New England Journal of Medicine, Journal of the American
Medical Association, and Annals of Internal Medicine as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993) (No. 92-102), 1993 WL 13006287, at *3.
308. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
309. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67
Brook. L. Rev. 13, 60 (2001). Professor Mnookin goes on to provide this
analogy: “The same argument could be made of eyewitness testimony, a
notoriously unreliable form of evidence. People are all distinct from one
another in observable ways; therefore the theoretical error rate of eyewitness
identification is zero, though in practice observers may frequently make
errors.” Id.; see also Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error
in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985,
1040 (2005) (stating that while a “distinction can be drawn between
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the examiner is the method.310 Finally, the court turned Daubert on its
head by requiring the defendant to prove the evidence was unreliable,
a distortion that would be employed in later cases.311
Then, United States v. Llera Plaza312 “sent shock waves through the
community of fingerprint analysts.”313 In that 2002 case, Judge Pollak
ruled that fingerprint experts would not be permitted to testify that
two sets of prints “matched”—that is, a positive identification to the
exclusion of all other persons. This was apparently the first time in over
ninety years that such a decision had been rendered.314 On rehearing,
however, Judge Pollak reversed himself,315 and later cases continued to
uphold the admissibility of fingerprint evidence.316 Nevertheless, the
case captured the attention of the media with news reports,317 main‘methodological’ and ‘practitioner’ error” in other areas, “in fingerprint
practice the concept is vacuous”).
310. See Zabell, supra note 305, at 172 (“But, given its unavoidable subjective
component, in latent print examination people are the process.”).
311. See Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science
(Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1167,
1173–76 (2003) (discussing the reversal of the burden of persuasion as one of
several judicial responses employed to avoid confronting the lack of empirical
testing); see also Giannelli, supra note 304, at 630.
312. 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa.
2002).
313. D.H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza,
21 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 1073, 1073 (2003).
314. As Professor Mnookin has noted, however, “fingerprints were accepted as an
evidentiary tool without a great deal of scrutiny or skepticism.” Mnookin,
supra note 309, at 17. She elaborated: “Even if no two people had identical
sets of fingerprints, this did not establish that no two people could have a
single identical print, much less an identical part of a print. These are
necessarily matters of probability, but neither the court in Jennings nor
subsequent judges ever required that fingerprinting identification be placed
on a secure statistical foundation.” Id. at 19.
315. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
316. See, e.g., United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (“We
agree with the decisions of our sister circuits and hold that the fingerprint
evidence admitted in this case satisfied Daubert.”); United States v. Janis,
387 F.3d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding fingerprint evidence reliable);
United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 244 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that
when assessed using the Daubert factors, the fingerprinting evidence
“pass[ed] muster”); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2003)
(finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
fingerprint analysis as evidence); United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d
700, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (finding that the possibility that two fingers may
have a portion of their print in common speaks to weight and not the
admissibility of fingerprint evidence).
317. E.g., Joann Loviglio, Trial Judge Reaffirms Fingerprint Usability; Hearing
Shows Him Science Involved, San Antonio Express-News, Mar. 14, 2002;
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stream publications,318 scientific journals,319 and television shows giving
it substantial coverage.320 A spate of legal articles followed,321 with some
commentators believing that Llera Plaza I was more faithful to Daubert
than Llera Plaza II.322 In response, the FBI adopted a “circle the
wagons” attitude, fiercely defending the technique. The head of the FBI
fingerprint section told 60 Minutes that the error rate was “zero,” examiners only testify to “hundred percent certainty,” and the FBI had
won “forty-one out of forty-one” legal challenges to fingerprint evidence.323
The appellate opinion most faithful to Daubert appeared in United
States v. Crisp324—unfortunately in dissent. The majority opinion
upheld the admissibility of fingerprint evidence by shifting the burden
of proof to the defendant and by grandfathering the technique.325 In
dissent, Judge Michael conscientiously applied the Daubert factors.
First, he noted that the “government did not offer any record of testing
Andy Newman, Judge Who Ruled Out Matching Fingerprints Changes his
Mind, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2002; Richard Willing, Judge Challenges
Fingerprint Identification, USA Today, Jan. 10, 2002.
318. See, e.g., Michael Specter, Do Fingerprints Lie? The Gold Standard of
Forensic Evidence Is Now Being Challenged, New Yorker (May 27, 2002),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/05/27/do-fingerprints-lie [https:
//perma.cc/T873-TJA7].
319. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 Science
339, 339–340 (2002).
320. 60 Minutes: Fingerprints: Infallible Evidence? (CBS television broadcast
Jan. 5, 2003).
321. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility
Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1189, 1189 (2004); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The
Myth of Fingerprint “Science” Is Revealed, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605, 607
(2002); Kristin Romandetti, Note, Recognizing and Responding to a Problem
with the Admissibility of Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 45
Jurimetrics 41, 53–56 (2004).
322. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, Issues in Sci.
& Tech., Fall 2003, at 47 (“Judge Pollak’s first opinion [restricting latent
fingerprint individualization testimony] was the better one.”); Recent Case,
United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001), 115 Harv. L. Rev.
2349, 2352 (2002) (“Fingerprint expert testimony does not survive
application of the Daubert factors . . . .”).
323. 60 Minutes, supra note 320.
324. 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003).
325. Id. at 269 (“Put simply, Crisp has provided us no reason today to believe
that this general acceptance of the principles underlying fingerprint
identification has, for decades, been misplaced. Accordingly, the district
court was well within its discretion in accepting at face value the consensus
of the expert and judicial communities that the fingerprint identification
technique is reliable.”); see also Giannelli, supra note 304, at 632.
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on the reliability of fingerprint identification. . . . [T]here have not been
any studies to establish how likely it is that partial prints taken from a
crime scene will be a match for only one set of fingerprints in the
world.”326 Second, as for peer review:
[a]gain, the government offered no evidence on this factor at trial.
Fingerprint examiners . . . have their own professional
publications. . . . But unlike typical scientific journals, the
fingerprint publications do not run articles that include or prompt
critique or reanalysis by other scientists. Indeed, few of the
articles address the principles of fingerprint analysis and
identification at all . . . .327

Third, “an error rate must be demonstrated by reliable scientific
studies, not by assumption.”328 Fourth, “the government did not establish that there are objective standards in the fingerprint examination
field to guide examiners in making their comparisons.”329 Fifth, while
acknowledging general acceptance in the fingerprint community, the
judge remarked that “[n]othing in the record in this case shows that the
fingerprint examination community has challenged itself sufficiently or
has been challenged in any real sense by outside scientists.”330
2. Madrid Train Bombing

Llera Plaza was soon eclipsed by a more sensational event—the
FBI’s misidentification of Brandon Mayfield as the source of the crime
scene prints in the terrorist train bombing in Madrid on March 11,
2004.331 More than any other event, the Mayfield affair exposed the
myth of fingerprint infallibility. This debacle resulted in investigations

326. Id. at 273–74 (Michael, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 274 (citing Epstein, supra note 321, at 644.
328. Id. The judge added: “In a 1995 test conducted by a commercial testing
service, less than half of the fingerprint examiners were able to identify
correctly all of the matches and eliminate the non-matches. On a similar test
in 1998, less than sixty percent of the examiners were able to make all
identifications and eliminations. . . . An error rate that runs remarkably close
to chance can hardly be viewed as acceptable under Daubert.” Id. at 275
(citing Epstein, supra note 321, at 634–35).
329. Id. at 276.
330. Id.
331. See Sara Kershaw, Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest,
N.Y. Times, June 5, 2004, at A1 (Spanish authorities cleared Brandon
Mayfield and matched the fingerprints to an Algerian national); Flynn
McRoberts & Maurice Possley, Report Blasts FBI Lab: Peer Pressure Led
to False ID of Madrid Fingerprint, Chi. Trib., Nov. 14, 2004, at 1.
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by the FBI332 and the Inspector General of the DOJ (“IG”).333 One of
the more troubling aspects of these reports dealt with the culture in the
laboratory. The FBI internal investigation found that “[t]o disagree was
not an expected response,”334 and the IG reported that “FBI examiners
did not attempt to determine the basis of the [Spanish National Police’s]
doubts before reiterating that they were ‘absolutely confident’ in the
identification on April 15, a full week before the FBI Laboratory met
with the SNP.”335
In addition to highlighting the lack of foundational research, these
events raised a host of other issues, including: (1) the role of cognitive
bias in subjective techniques,336 (2) the lack of well-defined standards,337
(3) the failure to administer rigorous proficiency tests,338 (4) the
332. See Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint
Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. Forensic
Identification 707 (2004).
333. See Office of the Inspector Gen., DOJ, A Review of the FBI’s
Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case: Unclassified Executive
Summary 7 (2006) (“Having found as many as 10 points of unusual
similarity, the FBI examiners began to ‘find’ additional features in [the
print] that were not really there, but rather were suggested to the examiners
by features in the Mayfield prints.”).
334. Stacey, supra note 332, at 713.
335. Office of the Inspector Gen., supra note 333, at 10.
336. See Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable
to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 Forensic Sci. Int’l 74, 75–76
(2006) (reporting an experiment that showed fingerprint examiners changed
their opinions when provided with irrelevant information); Elizabeth F.
Loftus & Simon A. Cole, Letter to the Editor, Contaminated Evidence,
Science, May 2004, at 959, 959(“[F]orensic scientists remain stubbornly
unwilling to confront and control the problem of bias, insisting that it can
be overcome through sheer force of will and good intentions.”); Stacey,
supra note 332, at 713 (“confirmation bias”). See generally D. Michael
Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 Cal.
L. Rev. 1, 39 (2002).
337. Examiners follow a procedure known as Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation,
and Verification (ACE-V). See Zabell, supra note 305, at 178 (“ACE-V is
an acronym, not a methodology. It is merely the common sense description
of what anyone would do if they were examining a latent and a candidate
source print.”).
338. See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 274 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J.,
dissenting) (“Proficiency testing is typically based on a study of prints that
are far superior to those usually retrieved from a crime scene.”); United
States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (noting that
“the FBI examiners got very high proficiency grades, but the tests they took
did not. . . . [O]n the present record I conclude that the proficiency tests are
less demanding than they should be.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Editorial, A
Blow to the Credibility of Fingerprint Evidence, Boston Globe, Feb. 2,
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manipulation of research,339 and (5) other instances of misidentifications.340 The FBI did not undertake a serious review of fingerprints
until it was compelled to address the issue due to the negative publicity
surrounding the Mayfield misidentification. Even then, however, the
FBI still characterized the technique as “scientific.”341
The scientific community continued to note the lack of research,342
and the courts continued to ignore this fact.343 Indeed, in United States
2004 (“There are no systematic proficiency tests to evaluate examiners’ skill.
Those tests that exist are not routinely used and are substandard.”).
339. See Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Forensic Science: Oxymoron?, Science,
Dec. 5 2003, at 1625, 1625 (discussing the cancellation of a National
Academies project designed to examine various forensic science techniques,
including fingerprinting, because the DOJ and Defense insisted on a right of
review that the Academy had refused to other grant sponsors); United States
v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 255 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We are deeply discomforted
by Mitchell’s contention—supported by Dr. Rau’s account of events, though
contradicted by other witnesses—that a conspiracy within the DOJ
intentionally delayed the release of the solicitation until after Mitchell’s jury
reached a verdict. Dr. Rau’s story, if true, would be a damning indictment
of the ethics of those involved.”). See generally Giannelli, supra note 201
(discussing the manipulation of forensic science research, including
fingerprint research, by law enforcement).
340. See Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent
Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985, 999 (2005)
(discussing twenty-two cases involving misattribution of latent fingerprints).
The misidentification cases include some that involved (1) verification by
one or more other examiners, (2) examiners certified by the International
Association of Identification, (3) procedures using a sixteen-point standard,
and (4) defense experts who corroborated misidentifications made by
prosecution experts. Id. at 1023–25; see also CNN Presents: Reasonable
Doubt (CNN television broadcast Jan. 9, 2005) (discussing the
misidentification of Riky Jackson, who spent two years in prison).
341. See Bruce Budowle et al., Review of the Scientific Basis for Friction Ridge
Comparisons as a Means of Identification: Committee Findings and
Recommendations, Forensic Sci. Comm., Jan. 2006, at 1, https://www2.
fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2006/research/2006_01_research02.htm
[https://perma.cc/86NF-XSBQ].
342. See Donald Kennedy & Richard A. Merrill, Assessing Forensic Science,
Issues in Sci. & Tech., Fall 2003, at 33, 34 (“The increased use of DNA
analysis, which has undergone extensive validation, has thrown into relief
the less firmly credentialed status of other forensic science identification
techniques (fingerprints, fiber analysis, hair analysis, ballistics, bite marks,
and tool marks). These have not undergone the type of extensive testing and
verification that is the hallmark of science elsewhere.”); Zabell, supra note
305, at 164 (“Although there is a substantial literature on the uniqueness of
fingerprints, it is surprising how little true scientific support for the
proposition exists.”).
343. See, e.g., United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105, 110 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The
district court did not abuse its discretion. Numerous courts have found
expert testimony on fingerprint identification based on the ACE-V method
to be sufficiently reliable under Daubert.”); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d
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v. Baines,344 decided in 2009, the head of the FBI fingerprint section
testified: “As to these ‘false positives’ . . . the FBI had ‘made, on
average, about one erroneous identification every 11 years.’ The total
number of identifications made has been about one million per
year . . . so that the known actual error rate was about one per eleven
million identifications.”345 Problematically, he merely assumed that all
the other identifications were correct, thus disqualifying his analysis.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this testimony was the lack of
self-awareness for a person who claimed to be a scientist.346
3. NAS Forensic Science Report (2009)

Fingerprint examiners follow a procedure known as Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification (ACE-V). The 2009 NAS report
observed that since “the ACE-V method does not specify particular
measurements or a standard test protocol . . . examiners must make
subjective assessments throughout.”347 Thus, the ACE-V method is too
“broadly stated” to “qualify as a validated method for this type of
analysis.”348 The Report added that “[t]he latent print community in
the United States has eschewed numerical scores and corresponding
thresholds” and consequently relies “on primarily subjective criteria” in
making the ultimate attribution decision.349 In making the decision, the
examiner must draw on his or her personal experience to evaluate such
factors as “inevitable variations in pressure,” but to date those factors
have not been “characterized, quantified, or compared.”350 In addition,
the Report gave short shrift to the zero-error-rate argument, finding
that “claims that these analyses have zero error rates are not scien-

1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he fingerprint evidence admitted in this case
satisfied Daubert.”); United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 2004)
(“We conclude the district court did not err in admitting the fingerprint
expert’s testimony.”); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir.
2004) (“We therefore accept that the error rate has been sufficiently
identified to count this factor as strongly favoring admission of the
[fingerprint] evidence.”).
344. 573 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009).
345. Id. at 984.
346. See White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 53 (“The fallacy is
obvious: the expert simply assumed without evidence that every error in
casework had come to light.”).
347. NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 139.
348. Id. at 142.
349. Id. at 141.
350. Id. at 144. Moreover, examiners lack population frequency data to quantify
the rarity or commonality of a particular type of fingerprint characteristic.
Id.
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tifically plausible.”351 In conclusion, the Report outlined an agenda for
the research it considered necessary “[t]o properly underpin the process
of friction ridge identification . . . .”352
Several studies were published after the NAS Report.353 The most
important was a FBI study published in 2011,354 which is discussed
below.
4. White House PCAST Report (2016)

According to the White House PCAST report, “latent fingerprint
analysis is a foundationally valid subjective methodology” and the FBI
“has lead the way” by conducting the black-box study.355 Nevertheless,
[the] false positive rate . . . is substantial and is likely to be higher
than expected by many jurors based on longstanding claims about
the infallibility of fingerprint analysis. The false-positive rate
could be as high as 1 error in 306 cases based on the FBI study
and 1 error in 18 cases based on a study by another crime
laboratory. In reporting results of [a] latent-fingerprint
examination, it is important to state the false-positive rates based
on properly designed validation studies . . . .356

Moreover, “testimony asserting any specific level of increased accuracy (beyond that measured in the studies) due to blind independent
verification would be scientifically inappropriate, as speculation
unsupported by empirical evidence.”357

351. Id. at 142; see also id. at 143 (“Some in the latent print community argue
that the method itself, if followed correctly . . . has a zero error rate. Clearly,
this assertion is unrealistic . . . . The method, and the performance of those
who use it, are inextricably linked, and both involve multiple sources of error
(e.g., errors in executing the process steps, as well as errors in human
judgment).”).
352. Id. at 144.
353. See White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 91–95.
354. Bradford T. Ulery et al., Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent
Fingerprint Decisions, 108 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Scis. 7733 (2011). The
White House PCAST Report described the methodology of the report: “To
attempt to ensure that the non-mated pairs were representative of the type
of matches that might arise when police identify a suspect by searching
fingerprint databases, the known prints were selected by searching the latent
prints against the 58 million fingerprints in the [Automated Fingerprint
Identification System] database and selecting one of the closest matching
hits.” White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 94.
355. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 9.
356. Id. at 9–10.
357. Id. at 96.
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5. AAAS Fingerprint Report (2017)

In September 2017, the AAAS published an extensive report on
fingerprint analysis.358 An accompanying news release, summarized the
report’s findings: “Courtroom testimony and reports stating or even
those implying that fingerprints collected from a crime scene belong to
a single person are indefensible and lack scientific foundation . . . .”359
The report reached a number of conclusions. First, claims that experts can identify the source of a latent print with 100 percent accuracy,
are “clearly overstated and are now widely recognized as indefensible.”360 Second, use of the term “identification” in reports and testimony even with qualifications “fail to deal forthrightly with the level
of uncertainty that exists in latent print examination” and “cannot be
justified scientifically.”361 Third, because of public misconceptions,
experts:
should acknowledge: (1) that the conclusions being reported are
opinions rather than facts (as in all pattern-matching disciplines),
(2) that it is not possible for a latent print examiner to determine
that two friction ridge impressions originated from the same
source to the exclusion of all others; and (3) that errors have
occurred in studies of the accuracy of latent print examination.362

The report went on to make several recommendations. Experts
should “avoid statements that claim or imply that the pool of possible
sources is limited to a single person. Terms like ‘match,’ ‘identification,’
‘individualization’ and their synonyms, imply more that the science can
sustain.”363 In addition, experts should “be prepared to discuss forth358. See AAAS Fingerprint Report, supra note 39.
359. Anne Q. Hoy, Fingerprint Source Identity Lacks Scientific Basis for Legal
Certainty: More Research into Validity of Fingerprint Comparisons Needed,
Forensic Report Says, AAAS (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.aaas.org/
news/fingerprint-source-identity-lacks-scientific-basis-legal-certainty [https:
//perma.cc/Z8SP-42KL].
360. AAAS Fingerprint Report, supra note 39, at 9.
361. Id. at 10.
362. Id. at 11.
363. Id. The report suggested that:
[E]xaminers might say something like the following: “The latent
print on Exhibit ## and the record fingerprint bearing the name
XXXX have a great deal of corresponding ridge detail with no
differences that would indicate they were made by different fingers.
There is no way to determine how many other people might have a
finger with a corresponding set of ridge features, but this degree of
similarity is far greater than I have ever seen in non-matched
comparisons.”
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rightly the results of research studies that tested the accuracy of latent
print examiners on realistic known-source samples.”364
Despite the ruckus created by Llera Plaza and the Mayfield fiasco,
examiner testimony remained unchanged. Testimony such as “zero error rates,” “matches to the exclusion of all other fingerprints,” and “100
percent certainty”—which had been used for decades—continued, while
the fingerprint community remained oblivious that such statements
were scientifically implausible. As with firearms identification, there is
a “lost decade” during which more research could have been conducted.
As one judge noted in a 2003 dissent: “The government has had ten
years to comply with Daubert. It should not be given a pass in this
case.”365 Those words were written fifteen years ago.
On a positive note, the Mayfield incident did trigger the FBI’s black
box study, which was a significant achievement. Still, this study was
released 100 years after the courts first admitted fingerprint evidence.366
The White House PCAST report found it “distressing” that properly
constructed validation studies had only been conducted recently and
only one study had been published in a peer-reviewed journal.367
Daubert has had little effect.368

III. Forensic Science Research
By now it is almost a truism that too many forensic disciplines are
not grounded in science—and yet their adherents continue to claim the
mantle of science. The 2009 NAS Report emphasized the “notable
dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies establishing the scientific
bases and validity of many forensic methods.”369 Indeed, the co-chair of
the NAS committee, Judge Harry Edwards, later stated: “I think that
the most important part of our committee’s report is its call for real

Id. at 11.
364. Id.
365. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J.,
dissenting).
366. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
367. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 95.
368. Some courts did, however, place limitations on the testimony. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Testimony at
the Daubert hearing indicated that some latent fingerprint examiners insist
that there is no error rate associated with their activities or that the
examination process is irreducibly subjective. This would be out-of-place
under Rule 702.”); Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 61 n.22
(Mass. 2010) (“[O]pinions expressing absolute certainty about, or the
infallibility of, an ‘individualization’ of a print should be avoided.”).
369. NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 8.
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science to support the forensic disciplines.”370 Not surprisingly, the report triggered extensive commentary.371 One article cataloged the numerous ways in which forensic science has failed to develop a research
culture372 and argued that the “core values” of a scientific culture “are
empiricism, transparency, and an ongoing critical perspective.”373
Another article documented the serious problems that have arisen when
law enforcement controls forensic research.374
A.

National Commission on Forensic Science (2013-17)

To its credit, the DOJ, in partnership with the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (“NIST”), established the National
Commission on Forensic Science in 2013. The commission’s task was to
enhance the practice and improve the reliability of forensic science.375
Early on, the commission created a subcommittee on scientific inquiry
and research, which undertook the task of reviewing bibliographies of
foundational literature that had been compiled by various forensic
disciplines.376 The subcommittee quickly concluded that even a “cursory
review” of the bibliographies raised serious concerns. One basic problem
involved the definition of foundational literature. According to the subcommittee, “[i]n some cases, it was unclear which literature citations
are crucial to support the foundation of a particular forensic science

370. Honorable Harry T. Edwards, The National Academy of Sciences Report on
Forensic Sciences: What it Means for the Bench and Bar, Address at
Conference of Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Washington, D.C.
(May 6, 2010), in 51 Jurimetrics 1, 9 (2010).
371. See Paul C. Giannelli, The 2009 NAS Forensic Science Report: A Literature
Review, 48 Crim. L. Bull. 378 (2012) (listing numerous articles and
conferences commenting on the report).
372. Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic
Sciences, 58 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 725 (2011).
373. Id. at 742.
374. See Giannelli, supra note 201.
375. National Commission on Forensic Science, DOJ, https://www.justice.
gov/ncfs [https://perma.cc/AGU4-VDR8] (last visited Oct. 19, 2017).
376. As a result of the 2009 NAS report, an Interagency Working Group—the
Research Development Technology and Evaluation (RDT&E) of the
National Science and Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Forensic
Science—was tasked with identifying foundational research in the forensic
sciences. The RDT&E committee requested Scientific Working Groups
(SWGs) to address a series of discipline-specific questions. In response,
literature compendiums were submitted to the RDT&E committee by
several forensic working groups. Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Council, Comm. on
Sci., Subcomm. on Forensic Sci., Strengthening the Forensic
Sciences (2014).
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discipline.”377 This finding led the subcommittee to define the term.
Foundational, scientific literature should consist of “original research,
substantive reviews of the original research, clinical trial reports, or
reports of consensus development conferences.”378 Tellingly, the
subcommittee felt compelled to add: “While other forms of dissemination of research and practice (e.g., oral and poster presentations at
meetings, workshops, personal communications, editorials, dissertations, theses, and letters to editors) play an important role in science,
the open, peer-reviewed literature is what endures and forms a foundation for further advancements.”379
The subcommittee’s second concern was that “[s]ome of the cited
literature had not undergone a rigorous peer-review process.”380 Peer review by other members of a forensic discipline is not sufficient.381 Many
of the reviewers are not scientists, and there is the problem with role
bias. According to the subcommittee, foundational research should be
subjected to “rigorous peer review with independent external reviewers
to validate the accuracy . . . [and] overall consistency with scientific
norms of practice”382 and “[p]ublished in a journal that is searchable
using free, publicly available search engines . . . .”383 With few

377. Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., DOJ, Scientific Literature in
Support of Forensic Science and Practice 2 (2015).
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 274 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J.,
dissenting) (“Fingerprint examiners . . . have their own professional
publications. . . . But unlike typical scientific journals, the fingerprint
publications do not run articles that include or prompt critique or reanalysis
by other scientists. Indeed, few of the articles address the principles of
fingerprint analysis and identification at all . . . .”). See also Zabell, supra
note 305, at 164 (“Although there is a substantial literature on the
uniqueness of fingerprints, it is surprising how little true scientific support
for the proposition exists.”).
382. Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., supra note 377, at 3 (“Published in a
journal that maintains a clear and publicly available statement of purpose
that encourages ethical conduct such as disclosure of potential conflicts of
interest integral to the peer review process.”).
383. Id. at 2. Other publication requirements include being: (1) “[p]ublished in a
journal or book that has an International Standard Number (ISSN for
journals; ISBN for books) and recognized expert(s) as authors (for books) or
on its Editorial Board (for journals);” and (2) “[p]ublished in a journal that
is indexed in databases that are available through academic libraries and
other services (e.g. JSTOR, Web of Science, Academic Search Complete, and
SciFinder Scholar).” Id. at 2–3.
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exceptions, the disciplines considered above have not satisfied these
requirements.384
Another recommendation—one on technical merit—provides: “All
forensic science methodologies should be evaluated by an independent
scientific body to characterize their capabilities and limitations in order
to accurately and reliably answer a specific and clearly defined forensic
question.”385 Significantly, the commission recommended that NIST be
the independent scientific evaluator within the justice system.

384. Another commission document provided guidance for evaluating scientific
literature. Nat’l Comm’n. on Forensic Sci., DOJ, Views of the
Commission Regarding Identifying and Evaluating Literature
that Supports the Basic Principles of a Forensic Science Method
or Forensic Science Discipline (2016). This guidance includes:
•

Is the problem or hypothesis clearly stated?

•

Is the scope of the article clearly stated as appropriate
(article, case study, review, technical note, etc.)?

•

Is the literature review current, thorough, and relevant
to the problem being studied?

•

Does this work fill a clear gap in the literature or is it
confirmatory and/or incremental?

•

Are the experimental procedures clear and complete such
that the work could be easily reproduced?

•

Are the experimental methods appropriate to the
problem?

•

Are the methods fully validated to the necessary level of
rigor (fit for purpose)?

•

Are the data analysis and statistical methodology
appropriate for the problem, and explained clearly so it
can be reproduced?

•

Are the experimental results clearly and completely
presented and discussed?

•

Are omissions and limitations to the study discussed and
explained?

•

Are the results and conclusions reasonable and defensible
based on the work and the supporting literature?

•

Are the citations and references complete and accurate?

•

Are the references original (primary) and not secondary?

•

Are funding sources and other potential sources of
conflict of interest clearly stated?

Id. at 3.
385. Nat’l Comm’n. on Forensic Sci., DOJ, Views of the Commission:
Technical Merit Evaluation of Forensic Science Methods and
Practices 2 (2016); see also Nat’l Comm’n. on Forensic Sci., DOJ,
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B.

White House PCAST Report (2016)

Unlike the commission, which had a broad mandate, the White
House PCAST Report focused only on the validation issue. It took pains
to explain the concept of validation, noting that forensic methods must
be based on empirical studies and be “repeatable, reproducible, and accurate, at levels that have been measured and are appropriate to the
intended application.”386 The report recognized that forensic methods
may be either objective or subjective. Foundational validity for
objective methods “can be established by studying [and] measuring the
accuracy, reproducibility, and consistency of each of its individual
steps.”387 By definition, this approach is not possible with subjective
techniques because they involve significant human judgment. Consequently, validity and reliability for these methods must be based on
“black-box studies”—as if a “black box” is in the examiner’s head—in
which numerous examiners make decisions on many independent tests
in order to determine error rates.388
Importantly, the report also specified what does not qualify as
validation: “[N]either experience, nor judgment, nor good professional
practices (such as certification programs and accreditation programs,
standardized protocols, proficiency testing, and codes of ethics) can
substitute for actual evidence of foundational validity and reliability.”389
Moreover, expressions of confidence by individual examiners or a consensus among practitioners about accuracy cannot substitute for “error
rates estimated from relevant studies.”390 In sum, empirical evidence is
the “sine qua non” for establishing foundational validity.391
PCAST also recommended that NIST conduct scientific evaluations
of the validity of current and new forensic technologies: “[t]o ensure the
scientific judgments are unbiased and independent, such evaluations

Recommendation to the Attorney General Technical Merit
Evaluation of Forensic Science Methods and Practices 1 (2016).
386. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 4. Here, “repeatable”
means an examiner reaches the same result when analyzing the same sample.
“Reproducible” means that different examiners reach the same result when
analyzing the same sample. The term “accurate” means that “an examiner
obtains correct results both (1) for samples from the same source (true
positives) and (2) for samples from different sources (true negatives).”
Finally, “reliability” means “repeatability, reproducibility, and accuracy.”
Id. at 47.
387. Id. at 5.
388. Id. at 5–6.
389. Id. at 6.
390. Id.
391. Id.
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should be conducted by an agency which has no stake in the outcome.”392
In response, DOJ released a statement criticizing the report on the
day of its release. According to DOJ, the PCAST Report “does not
mention numerous published research studies which seem to meet
PCAST’s criteria for appropriately designed studies providing support
for foundational validity. That omission discredits the PCAST report
as a thorough evaluation of scientific validity.”393 PCAST, in turn,
invited all stakeholders to identify validity studies that it might have
overlooked. “DOJ ultimately concluded that it had no additional
studies for PCAST to consider.”394 Nor did the more than 400 papers
submitted by twenty-six respondents cause PCAST to change its
positions. The bottom line remained: “In science, empirical testing is
the only way to establish the validity and degree of reliability of such
an empirical method. Fortunately, empirical testing of empirical methods is feasible. There is no justification for accepting that a method is
valid and reliable in the absence of appropriate empirical evidence.”395
However, most prior studies use “closed-set design.”396 In these studies,
“the correct source of each questioned sample is always present; studies
using the closed-set design have underestimated the false-positive and
inconclusive rates by more than 100-fold.”397

IV. Independent Scientific Review
As discussed above, the courts have too often failed to fulfill their
“gatekeeper”398 function under Daubert. However, the Daubert Court
392. Id. at 14. The NAS report considered NIST before recommending an
independent agency but rejected the idea because, at that time, NIST had
limited ties to forensic science. See NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at
17.
393. FBI, Comments on PCAST Report to the President, Forensic
Science in Federal Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity
of Pattern Comparison Methods 1 (2016), http://www.crime-sceneinvestigator.net/PDF/fbi-response-to-forensic-science-in-federal-criminalcourts-ensuring-scientific-validity-of-pattern-comparison-methods.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/DTF5-RJ5M].
394. President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. and Tech., An Addendum
to the PCAST Report on Forensic science in Criminal Courts 3
(2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensics_addendum_finalv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/68
NX-6C6A]).
395. Id. at 4.
396. Id. at 7.
397. Id.
398. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (describing
Daubert as prescribing “a gatekeeping role for the judge”).
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also suggested that the adversary system would serve as a complementary safeguard, noting that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation
of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are
the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”399
Yet, these “traditional” means have also proved inadequate. After
the release of the NAS Report, some commentators focused on defense
counsel’s incompetence.400 A 2009 study of the cases of 137 convicts
exonerated by DNA profiling revealed that “[d]efense counsel rarely
made any objections to the invalid forensic science testimony in these
trials and rarely effectively cross-examined forensic analysts who provided invalid science testimony.”401 One commentator summed it up
this way:
Unlike the extremely well-litigated civil challenges, the criminal
defendant’s challenge is usually perfunctory. Even when the most
vulnerable forensic sciences—hair microscopy, bite marks, and
handwriting—are attacked, the courts routinely affirm
admissibility citing earlier decisions rather than facts established
at a hearing. Defense lawyers generally fail to build a challenge
with appropriate witnesses and new data. Thus, even if inclined
to mount a Daubert challenge, they lack the requisite knowledge
and skills, as well as the funds, to succeed.402

Although the defense bar bears some responsibility for Daubert’s
failure, there are limits to what can be expected of overburdened and
chronically underfunded public defenders when dealing with expert

399. Id. at 596 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
400. See Gertner, supra note 36, at 790 (“[T]he NAS Report’s concerns will not
be fully met until advocacy changes.”); D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC
Report on Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught with Pitfalls, 2010
Utah L. Rev. 225, 242 (2010) (“Criminal defense lawyers . . . are supposed
to be the people who recognize bogus expert claims, challenge them, move
to get them excluded, and undermine those that survive exclusion by
knowledgeable, thorough, and telling cross-examination. On the whole, they
don’t do any of these things very well.”).
401. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 102, at 89.
402. Neufeld, supra note 25, at S110.
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testimony. Better training for defense counsel—which is sorely
needed—is not sufficient. Similarly, access to defense experts—also
sorely needed—may not be adequate.403 Defense experts can challenge
prosecution experts’ methods and opinions but do not have the funds
to conduct foundational research, nor can they act as independent evaluators of foundational research on an ongoing basis.404
An independent scientific review is required. NAS has published the
most authoritative and independent reviews of forensic science. In addition to the forensic report, NAS issued reports on sound spectrometry
(“voiceprints”),405 DNA profiling,406 polygraph testing,407 and bullet lead
analysis.408 But NAS is not a governmental entity, and its work depends
on outside funding. The justice system needs scientific expertise on a
continuing basis—and thus institutionalized.
The National Commission’s proposal, endorsed by PCAST, tasked
NIST with the responsibility of evaluating forensic disciplines on an
ongoing basis.409 It should be adopted. NIST has the expertise and
independence for this task and has been increasingly involved in forensic
research. There would be a cost, but litigating validity issues across the
country at Daubert and Frye hearings also has a cost. Moreover, there

403. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert
Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1305
(2004) (discussing the legal disputes over the scope of Ake—e.g., whether it
applied to non-capital cases and to non-psychiatric experts).
404. Although prosecutors are ethically obligated to avoid the use of flawed
forensic testimony, the National District Attorneys Association recently
asserted that bite mark evidence is a “reliable science”—an untenable
position. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. See generally Paul C.
Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert
Witnesses, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1493 (2007).
405. Nat’l Research Council, Nat’l Acad. of Scis., On the Theory and
Practice of Voice Identification (1979).
406. Nat’l Research Council, Nat’l Acad. of Scis., The Evaluation of
Forensic DNA Evidence (1996); National Research Council, Nat’l
Acad. of Scis., DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992).
407. Nat’l Research Council, Nat’l Acad. of Scis., The Polygraph and
Lie Detection (2003).
408. Nat’l Research Council, Nat’l Acad. of Scis., Forensic Analysis:
Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence (2004).
409. In 2005, Peter Neufeld proposed an institute of forensic science. Neufeld,
supra note 25, at S113.

934

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018
Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure

is a significant expense associated with rectifying the past mistakes that
occurred with hair,410 bullet lead,411 DNA,412 and arson cases.413
Unfortunately, the current Attorney General did not renew the
commission’s charter in April 2017.414 The independent scientists on the
commission objected to this action, writing:
The Justice Department now proposes to improve forensic science
by moving its oversight and development to an office within the
department. This is precisely the opposite of what was
recommended by the National Academy of Sciences report and
the NCFS. It is a step backwards, because it reinforces the
conditions that contributed to the current problems, namely,
placing this discipline within the control of law enforcement and
prosecutors. The Justice Department is home to many dedicated
public servants including scientists whose passion for justice is
unquestioned. However, DOJ is not a scientific body, and it is
difficult to see how forensic science can become a true science in
410. See David R. Cameron, Forum: Review of FBI Lab Suggests Huge Number
of Wrongful Convictions, New Haven Register (April 26, 2015, 5:24 PM),
http://www.nhregister.com/opinion/article/Forum-Review-of-FBI-lab-sugges
ts-huge-number-of-11353007.php [https://perma.cc/3NVM-2UN8] (“The FBI
review has identified roughly 2,500 cases that fit those criteria. The review
is still in its early stages; thus far, it has considered 268 trials involving 284
defendants. It has found that lab examiners gave flawed testimony regarding
the comparison of hairs in 257 of the 268 trials—more than 95 percent.
Almost all of the examiners over that period—26 of 28—presented flawed
testimony.”).
411. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
412. See Lauren Kirchner, Traces of Crime: How New York’s DNA Techniques
Became Tainted, N.Y. Times (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/04/nyregion/dna-analysis-evidence-new-york-disputed-techniques.
html [https://perma.cc/H46S-9AQF] (explaining that two controversial
techniques have been discontinued); Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Notifies Crime
Labs of Errors Used in DNA Match Calculations Since 1999, Wash. Post
(May 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-notifiescrime-labs-of-errors-used-in-dna-match-calculations-since-1999/2015/05/29/
f04234fc-0591-11e5-8bda-c7b4e9a8f7ac_story.html?utm_term=.2eed2704c8
35 [https://perma.cc/GUZ3-VC4E] (“The FBI has notified crime labs across
the country that it has discovered errors in data used by forensic scientists
in thousands of cases to calculate the chances that DNA found at a crime
scene matches a particular person, several people familiar with the issue
said.”).
413. See supra Section 2.C.
414. See Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Orders Justice Dept. to End Forensic Science
Commission, Suspend Review Policy, Wash. Post (April 10, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/sessions-orders-justice-deptto-end-forensic-science-commission-suspend-review-policy/2017/04/10/2dad
a0ca-1c96-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html?utm_term=.f2d36117b56d
[https://perma.cc/XH7V-ZFWG].
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that environment. Science flourishes when free and independent;
only then can the tools and technology that it creates be truly
reliable.415

The AAAS concurred, also stressing that independence “cannot be
overstated” and expressing concern about the “inherent conflict of interest in having law enforcement overseeing the work of forensic labs
on which police and prosecutors rely to win and defend convictions.”416
The American Academy of Forensic Science also opposed the formation
of an Office of Forensic Science within DOJ.417 Instead of heeding this
advice, the Attorney General appointed a prosecutor instead of a scientist to head the working group within the DOJ.418
These recent events should be put in context. The 2009 NAS Report
recommended the creation of an independent federal entity—the
National Institute of Forensic Sciences—to oversee the field, including
the establishment of a research agenda.419 If adopted, this proposal
would have wrest control of forensic science from law enforcement. The
report provided the following justification: Some federal entities were
“too wedded” to the status quo and “have failed to pursue a rigorous
research agenda to confirm the evidentiary reliability of methodologies
used in a number of forensic science disciplines.”420 As a result, these
415. Sunita Sah et al., We Must Strengthen the “Science” in Forensic Science,
Sci. Am. (May 8, 2017), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/
we-must-strengthen-the-science-in-forensic-science/ [https://perma.cc/47Y
F-479M].
416. Spencer S. Hsu, Science Organizations Renew Call for Independent U.S.
Committee on Forensics, Wash. Post (June 29, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/science-organizations-renew-call-forindependent-us-committee-on-forensics/2017/06/28/3ab8cdea-5b6a-11e7-9b7
d-14576dc0f39d_story.html?utm_term=.802de0997045
[https://perma.cc/X46C-SY6U].
417. Betty Layne DesPortes, Message from the AAFS President, Am. Acad.
of Forensic Scis. (April 3, 2017), https://news.aafs.org/presidentsmessage/message-from-the-aafs-president-april-2017/ [https://perma.cc/
4T3K-34HA].
418. See Pema Levy, Sessions’ New Forensic Science Adviser Has a History of
Opposing Pro-Science Reforms, Mother Jones (Aug. 10, 2017, 8:38 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2017/08/sessions-new-forensicscience-adviser-has-a-history-of-opposing-pro-science-reforms/ [https://perma.
cc/HAX9-QQDY] (“Attorney General Jeff Sessions has resisted efforts to
rein in forensic science and hold it to higher standards. And this week, he
appointed a senior adviser on forensics who has a history of opposing reforms
that would bring more accountability and scientific rigor to forensic crime
labs and expert testimony.”).
419. NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 19 (Recommendation 1(c):
“promoting scholarly, competitive peer-reviewed research and technical
development in the forensic science disciplines”).
420. Id. at 18.
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“agencies are not good candidates to oversee the overhaul of the forensic
science community . . . .”421 There is little question that the NAS was
referring to National Institute of Justice and the FBI Laboratory. The
report noted that, although both had provided “modest leadership” in
forensic science, “neither entity has recognized, let alone articulated, a
need for change or a vision for achieving it.”422 Consequently, “advancing science in the forensic science enterprise is not likely to be achieved
within the confines of DOJ.”423 In fact, law enforcement had manipulated science in the past by shaping the research agenda, limiting access
to data, attacking experts who disagreed with its positions, and “spinning” negative reports.424
When Congress did not authorize the creation of the National
Institute of Forensic Sciences, DOJ, to its credit, established the NCFS.
Most importantly, independent scientists were appointed to the commission.425 Placing science back under the DOJ now is a major and
unjustified retreat.

Conclusion
This Article explained how the judiciary’s failure to fulfill its gatekeeper role can be traced back to its refusal to demand and properly
evaluate foundational research—i.e., Daubert’s first factor, empirical
testing. This failure has been systemic. Flawed forensic techniques such
as bite mark analysis, microscopic hair comparisons, arson evidence,
and comparative bullet lead analysis were routinely admitted into evidence without foundational research. In addition, firearms, toolmark,
and fingerprint examiners repeatedly presented overstated and misleading conclusions. This Article also argued that the justice system may
be institutionally incapable of applying Daubert in criminal cases because it does not have access to independent scientific expertise on an
ongoing basis, and endorsed the NCFS and PCAST recommendation
that NIST should be tasked with this responsibility.
Even if an independent scientific review is not institutionalized,
PCAST, NCFS, and AAAS have provided guidance for courts dealing
with admissibility challenges. First, the flawed techniques discussed in
421. Id.
422. Id. at 16. The Report also stated: “Neither has the full confidence of the
larger forensic science community. And because both are part of a
prosecutorial department of the government, they could be subject to subtle
contextual biases that should not be allowed to undercut the power of
forensic science.” Id.
423. Id. at 18.
424. See Giannelli, supra note 201.
425. Having served on the NCFS, the Author believes that there should have
been more independent scientists on the Commission.
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this Article should be excluded. If used at all, bite mark analysis should
be limited to exclusions and perhaps to closed universe situations.426 For
hair analysis, mitochondrial DNA analysis is far superior to microscopy.
Arson evidence should comport with NFPA 921 and the AAAS report.
As noted above, the FBI has abandoned comparative bullet lead
analysis.
Second, courts should focus, as Daubert requires, on foundational
research. According to PCAST, “neither experience, nor judgment, nor
good professional practices (such as certification programs and accreditation programs, standardized protocols, proficiency testing, and codes
of ethics) can substitute for actual evidence of foundational validity and
reliability.”427 The NCFS concurred.428
Third, subjective methods can be empirically tested. Such research
has been conducted. PCAST identified studies in fingerprint and firearms identification that meet stringent standards.429 These studies show
an error rate, which should be presented to the jury.430 However, more
than one study is needed.
Fourth, in ruling on admissibility in firearms, toolmark, and fingerprint examination cases, courts should appreciate that there has been
a “lost decade”—or two—during which rigorous research was not
conducted.431 Instead, the disciplines examined in this article vigorously
426. See, e.g., State v. Lambright, No. M2012-02538-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL
46839, at *6 (Jan. 7, 2014) (“Dr. Tabor said that, considering the number of
teeth that the victim’s sister had, she would not have been capable of
producing the bite mark found on the victim’s nose and upper lip. It was Dr.
Tabor’s expert medical opinion that a two-year-old was not capable of
producing the nature, severity, number, and orientation of bites sustained
by the victim.”).
427. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 6.
428. See supra note 379 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance of
published peer review research).
429. See supra note 367 and accompanying text (noting that closed-set studies
are not sufficiently robust).
430. If examiners claim that there is no error rate, they should be required to
explain why not. See White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 19
(“In testimony, examiners should always state clearly that errors can and do
occur, due both to similarities between features and to human mistakes in
the laboratory.”).
431. This depends on when the clock started ticking. Daubert was decided in 1993.
In 1995, the first challenge to handwriting testimony was decided. United
States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). As noted above,
the Williamson case on microscopic hair analysis was decided the same year.
See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. Llera Plaza was decided in
2002. See supra notes 312–315 and accompanying text (addressing the
admissibility of fingerprint testimony). And Green was decided in 2005. See
supra notes 254–258 and accompanying text (addressing firearms
identification testimony). Moreover, during this period numerous courts
restricted the use of handwriting identification. See, e.g., United States v.
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resisted the views of independent scientists, and they were typically
supported by prosecutors. For example, the wrongful execution of
Cameron Todd Willingham, which triggered numerous scientific reviews, was not enough to persuade the Texas Fire Marshal Office that
its evidence was flawed,432 and it took a serendipitous event—the
Madrid train bombing—to provoke fingerprint research.
In short, forensic evidence is in a “Catch-22” situation: Only the
federal government has the resources to fund the needed independent
research, but it has no incentive to do so as long as evidence continues
to be admitted without proper limitations. Until more scientifically
sound studies are published and peer-reviewed by independent scientists, courts should follow the approach adopted in United States v.
Glynn,433 which permitted the expert to testify only that it was “more
likely than not” that recovered bullets and cartridge cases came from a
particular weapon.434
Fifth, the presentation of expert testimony needs to be controlled.
Once again, PCAST made several recommendations, including:
Statements suggesting or implying greater certainty are not
scientifically valid and should not be permitted. In particular,
courts should never permit scientifically indefensible claims such
as: “zero,” “vanishingly small,” “essentially zero,” “negligible,”
“minimal,” or “microscopic” error rates; “100 percent certainty”
or proof “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty;”
identification “to the exclusion of all other sources;” or a chance
of error so remote as to be a “practical impossibility.”435

The NCFS also recommended against the use of the phrase
“reasonable degree of scientific certainty”436 and the 2009 NAS report
criticized the use of “zero error rates” and claims of infallibility.437 The
recent AAAS fingerprint report found no scientific justification for
statements of “identity” or “practical certainty” and cautioned against
the use of terms such as “match,” “identification,” and “individualization.”438
Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 73–74 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that expert
testimony concerning the general similarities and differences between a
defendant’s handwriting exemplar and a stick up note was admissible but
not the specific conclusion that the defendant was the author).
432. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
433. 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
434. Id. at 575.
435. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 19.
436. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
437. See supra Section III.B.3.
438. AAAS Fingerprint Report, supra note 39, at 11.
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Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe that examiners will
give up their claims that there is a scientific foundation for their discipline. A subjective method without a meaningful protocol can hardly
claim to be a science. This is not a new issue, as an editorial in the prestigious scientific journal, Science, entitled “Forensic Science: Oxymoron?” and written by the editor-in-chief, made the same point fifteen
years ago.439 Similarly, the 2009 NAS Report commented: “The law’s
greatest dilemma in its heavy reliance on forensic evidence . . . concerns
the question of whether, and to what extent, there is science in any
given forensic science discipline.”440 After Daubert hearings, one court
“very quickly concluded that whatever else ballistics identification analysis could be called, it could not fairly be called ‘science.’”441 The same
is true of fingerprint examinations.
Courts should also guard against attempts to introduce claims of
“science” through the backdoor by means of circumlocutions such as
statements that firearms and fingerprint identifications are subjective
techniques that are “based on science.” This is misleading. Many things
are “based on science”—e.g., riding a bike, throwing a curve ball, and
flying a kite.
Sixth, proficiency testing issues will continue to be litigated. These
tests have long been suspect. They are not conducted blind and are not
challenging.442 The President of Collaborative Testing Services told the
439. See Kennedy, supra note 339 (discussing the cancellation of a National
Academies project designed to examine various forensic science techniques,
including fingerprinting, because the Departments of Justice and Defense
insisted on a right of review that the Academy had refused to other grant
sponsors).
440. NAS Forensics Sciences Report, supra note 26, at 9.
441. United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). See also
United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(“[F]orensic document examination, despite the existence of a certification
program, professional journals and other trappings of science, cannot, after
Daubert, be regarded as ‘scientific . . . knowledge.’”); id. at 1041 (“[W]hile
scientific principles may relate to aspects of handwriting analysis, they have
little or nothing to do with the day-to-day tasks performed by [Forensic
Document Examiners]. . . . [T]his attenuated relationship does not transform
the FDE into a scientist.”).
442. For example, a fingerprint examiner from New Scotland Yard testified in
one case that the FBI proficiency tests were deficient: “It’s not testing their
ability. It doesn’t test their expertise. I mean I’ve set these tests to trainees
and advanced technicians. And if I gave my experts these tests, they’d fall
about laughing.” United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558
(E.D. Pa. 2002). The district court agreed, noting that “the FBI examiners
got very high proficiency grades, but the tests they took did not. . . . [O]n
the present record I conclude that the proficiency tests are less demanding
than they should be.” Id. at 565. Similarly, in a trial involving handwriting
comparisons, the court wrote:
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NCFS “during its seventh meeting on August 10, 2015 that he has been
under commercial pressure to make proficiency tests easier.”443

There were aspects of Mr. Cawley’s testimony that undermined his
credibility. Mr. Cawley testified that he achieved a 100% passage
rate on the proficiency tests that he took and that all of his peers
always passed their proficiency tests. Mr. Cawley said that his peers
always agreed with each others’ results and always got it right. Peer
review in such a “Lake Woebegone” environment is not meaningful.
United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D.W. Va. 2002); see
supra note 338 (discussing fingerprint proficiency testing).
443. Nat’l Comm. on Forensic Sci., Views of the Commission: Optimizing
Human Performance in Crime Laboratories through Testing and
Feedback (May 27, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/864776/
download [https://perma.cc/8BPS-DEER]).
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